

surplus generated by cultural exchange. That promised narrative, an imperialist one of national and religious victory, encounters resistance.

Significantly, the moment at which she first breaks down and openly weeps before them occurs in the context of Indian laughter. It is striking that what seems most to unnerve and upset Mary Rowlandson about the Indians—far more than the bundle of bloodied Puritan garments in one Indian's wigwam, for example—are their laughter and celebrations, which she records with some consistency. When she is denied permission, during her first night of captivity, to sleep in an abandoned house, she receives the amused but unappreciated Indian response of “what will you love English men still?” Instead she is forced to witness an Indian victory celebration and to hear “the roaring, and singing and dancing, and yelling of those black creatures in the night” (121). When she falls from a horse during their journey, “they like inhumane creatures laugh, and rejoiced to see it” (123). Later in her captivity, during a particularly clumsy river crossing “the Indians stood laughing to see me staggering along,” resulting in “teares running down mine eyes” (147). The sudden appearance after this incident of a band of Indians “dressed in English Apparel,” surely suggesting an English military loss, simply “damped my spirit” (148) in comparison. Mary Rowlandson hears and records the sometimes humiliating, sometimes ironic laughter of the Indians, although she is, of course, incapable of sharing in it or even of recognizing such moments as comic. She remains deaf, for example, to the subversive humor of the Indians' boasting that “they had done them [a defeated English military company] a good turn, to send them to Heaven so soon” (160).

What is remarkable about such passages is not that Rowlandson records them—after all, she inserts them in order to illustrate her captors' insensitivity and inhumanity—but that they so consistently portray the Indians with a complexity and a detail utterly absent from other representations of Amerindians in colonial New England literature by Puritans. Descriptions such as these never explicitly intrude onto Mary Rowlandson's consistently unmodified assertions that the Indians are cruel, savage, barbarous heathen who act as instruments of Satan. A challenge to that belief, however, is inscribed linguistically in the dialogue she records, and that challenge disrupts the stable operation of religious discourse and national ideology in this text. The Indians laugh, and the gap between their world and their captive's can suddenly be defined in culturally complex ways rather than in terms of typological oppositions. As a culturally liminal figure, Rowlandson's perception of the Indians as types is coupled with the detailed observations necessary to her survival within this strange culture. Algonquin ceremonies, which she considers meaningless if not absurd, are nevertheless intimately described; their dress, their eating habits, their mourning practices, even the

vanity of an Indian woman, are all recorded so that “I may the better declare what happened to me.” There is no real need, then, to document in detail the domestic restoration of her family at the end of her narrative, not because it is an event without importance but because it is an event whose ritual significance she already understands.

Transgression erupts in Rowlandson's captivity narrative precisely where the logic of Puritan discourse breaks down. The acts of exchange that she records threaten the stability of Puritan ideology and its typological economy of equivalence. Moments of Indian laughter, celebrations and rituals performed by groups of Indians, an Indian's gift of an English Bible to the captive, Quinnapin's query to Rowlandson of “When I washt me? I told him not this month, then he fetcht me some water himself, and bid me wash, and gave me the Glass to see how I lookt” (150): these are all events that Rowlandson struggles to incorporate into the structures of typology and providence that organize Puritan discourse. In her interpretation the laughter and dances are tests of her spiritual fortitude, and the acts of generosity are divine providences, the sudden intercession of God—operating through Indian figures—on her behalf. Yet an accumulated cultural surplus provokes a resistance within this simple exchange of act for type. The five “remarkable passages of providence” that she catalogs at the conclusion of her narrative are beset by a similar failure to add up convincingly. These providences are in fact most remarkable as providences that favor the Indians, which Rowlandson is able to appropriate for herself and the English military only by an awkward process of reversal that continually threatens to collapse in upon itself, by a fudging of accounts that can barely conceal its own flawed math. This substitutive failure is all the more evident as a result of both Rowlandson's and Increase Mather's desire for its success, for it is only with the success of substitution that historical succession can proceed, Rowlandson's redemption can be secured, and the promise of the New England project be fulfilled.

The publication of her narrative circulates within the larger Puritan society two often incompatible and inequivalent discourses, in which the representation of the Algonquins in Rowlandson's liminal discourse exceeds and escapes their representation in her orthodox Puritan discourse. That inequivalence creates possibilities that, for Bakhtin, define the novel: “an acute feeling for language boundaries (social, national and semantic),” a fracturing of the “absolute fusion of ideological meaning with language,” the ability of a culture to become “conscious of itself as only one among *other* cultures and languages,” the emergence of “speaking human beings” from behind the “words, forms, styles” of national language forms (370). Puritan ideology's typological image of the Indian must suddenly confront a “speaking human” Indian.

As this chapter has demonstrated, Rowlandson's readers were confronted with a series of new and radical possibilities in her narrative. Those possibilities were nevertheless sufficiently recuperated or obscured to allow Increase Mather to advertise her text as a vehicle for reinforcing the dominant social, political, and theological codes that her narrative otherwise appears to challenge or upset. This unusual fracturing or doubling within her text has the effect of representing more than one version of the subject Mary Rowlandson, and that complexity and inconsistency point toward the representation of self associated with the novel. As Deidre Lynch argues, what characterizes the novel form is less the expression of "a singular interiority" than "a contradictory relation between personal truths and the forms that make them publicly apprehensible, between actual and stipulated mental states." It is therefore in this "lack of fit between multiple accounts of the self" (142) that the subjectivity associated with the novel is located. When the Indians laugh at Mary Rowlandson, for example, her discomfort seems rooted in part in a sense that the comical figure they perceive is not equivalent to her own self-perception. Rowlandson's captivity narrative puts not only multiple accounts of herself—as Puritan goodwife and mother, as independent producer-exchanger—into circulation among a transatlantic reading public, but it circulates also competing versions of Amerindian culture. If this gives the representation of the captive a sense of incipient psychological depth, it likewise gives to Algonquin culture unprecedented dimensions of cultural breadth and depth.

Mary Rowlandson's captivity narrative was originally published with her first husband's last sermon, a jeremiad delivered on Fast Day to his Puritan congregation in Wethersfield, Connecticut. By binding together a minister's sermon exhorting the community to fast with a narrative in which the minister's wife struggles daily against literal starvation, the first editions of this book may have enhanced its plea for a resurgent Puritan piety. The eventual disappearance of Joseph Rowlandson's sermon from subsequent editions suggests in retrospect what its Puritan readership probably already felt: Mrs. Rowlandson's narrative achieved the effect that Puritan ministers had long been striving to instill in their congregations. *The Possibility of God's Forsaking a People Who Have Been Near and Dear to Him*, the title of the Reverend Joseph Rowlandson's final sermon, may well have seemed a more tangible and threatening possibility in the wife's literal experience than in the husband's weekly sermon. As Derounian suggests ("Publication" 255), the readers of Rowlandson's captivity narrative probably derived as much secular fascination from it as they did religious inspiration.

It is also likely, however, that Rowlandson's *Narrative* itself was one of the forces that helped to create those more secular reading interests through its liminal generic form. Rowlandson is able to contain and make sense of

her unusual experience only by combining elements of the various narrative structures available to her, yet the narrative dialogism of her text exceeds the sum of that combination, just as elements of her experience among the Algonquins escape her effort to understand "what happened to me during that grievous Captivity." Within this text's conservative theological message is a dialogic and cultural surplus that escapes through the seams of the act of substitution. The genre combination Rowlandson practices is like the transgressive "additional" generated by the friction of exchange: it adds to but will not add up. The Puritans purchase Mary Rowlandson, and the Algonquins receive twenty pounds, but this transaction is hardly as clean and simple as it appears. However effectively this captivity narrative circulated an appeal for renewed piety, it could not help but circulate an appealing story of cultural escape. Richard Slotkin has suggested that captivity by Indians was virtually the only acceptable way for a Puritan to experience the otherwise forbidden wilderness and the Indian culture that inhabited it (*Regeneration* 100). Edward M. Griffin (47) and Christopher Castiglia (4) note that, for many female captives, release from the Indians frequently promised only a return to captivity in another form—as a domestic wife and mother in Puritan New England. As these compelling readings suggest, the captivity narrative offered readers a transgressive account of legitimized escape from dominant social and moral norms.

Narratives like Mary Rowlandson's, which recalled such experiences of cultural exchange, expose the possibility of an ambivalent and unquantifiable value that, in Homi Bhabha's words, "adds to" but does not "add up." The "additional" generated by the friction of cultural exchange produces a difference that would allow Mary White Rowlandson's captivity narrative, without changing a word, to be advertised as a story neither about God nor about an exemplary figure of piety but about the individual Mary White Rowlandson, a figure that readers would come not only to identify *as* a virtuous type but to identify *with* in a relation of sympathy. Cotton Mather, less than twenty years after his father published the preface to the first Puritan captivity narrative, tells the audience of one of the last Puritan captivity narratives that its instructive value is signified by its reader's involuntary need to cry for the suffering captive.³² The captive returns from the colonial borderland of cultural exchange as an individualized but also a transculturated subject, developments essential to the sympathetic identification on which sentimental discourse depends. Indeed, it would be the emergent sensitivity to the transgressive surplus in narratives like Rowlandson's that would necessitate sentimental discourse and its veil of tears. Narratives like hers inevitably revealed the boundaries of the Anglo-American Puritan culture that consumed them, probably moving its readers to desire both a re-drawing and a crossing of those boundaries. Such ambivalent desires would

continue to define captivity narratives, which, over the following century, begin to look more and more like sentimental novels precisely as a result of their struggle to contain such transgressive elements and the mobility that produced them.

Chapter 2

BETWEEN ENGLAND AND AMERICA: CAPTIVITY, SYMPATHY, AND THE SENTIMENTAL NOVEL

DURING HER 1676 captivity by Algonquin Indians in the New England wilderness, Mary Rowlandson turns, in one of the numerous scriptural references that mark her 1682 narrative, to a particular psalm: "I fell a weeping which was the first time to my remembrance that I wept before them. . . . now may I say as, Psal. 137.1. *By the rivers of Babylon, there we sate down: yea, we wept when we remembered Zion*" (134). On the other side of the Atlantic and over half a century later, the captive heroine of Samuel Richardson's 1740 *Pamela* invokes the same tearful psalm:

I remembering the 137th Psalm to be a little touching, turned to it, and took the Liberty to alter it to my case . . .

*When sad I sat in B—n-hall,
All watched round about,
And thought of every absent Friend,
The tears for Grief burst out. (127)*

If these two captive women were moved to tears by their experiences, their accounts of captivity inspired a correspondent sympathy in their readers. Indeed, audiences were apparently captivated by these two books: both Rowlandson's narrative and Richardson's *Pamela* were transatlantic best-sellers, appealing to popular reading tastes in colonial New England as well as in England.¹ That popularity has been accounted for by the fact that these texts offered their audiences the highly desirable combination of a sensational and adventurous plot with moral and religious instruction, thereby inspiring not only tears but pious reform in their readers. We have seen how Mather's preface to Rowlandson's narrative, for example, uses the occasion of her recent captivity and of continuing Indian warfare to encourage religious conversion among readers. He insists that her particular account "makes deepest impression upon the affections" (116) and that her example of piety "deserves both commendation and imitation" (115). When Mather instructs readers to "Peruse, Ponder, and from hence lay by something from the experience of another against thine own turn comes" (117), he anticipates that seventeenth-century Puritans, by imagining themselves in the captive's place, might strive to resemble the converted and reformed Rowlandson.

By the time Richardson made a similar argument for *Pamela*, however, novels were regularly being condemned as morally damaging, and for virtually the same reason that Mather had praised Rowlandson's earlier narrative: the capacity to inspire sympathetic identification in readers. Because moralists and educators assumed that sympathy led to imitation, they believed that readers would be encouraged to repeat the transgressive adventures of the novelistic heroes and heroines with whom they identified. Eighteenth-century novelists and romance writers therefore strategically attempted to position their work in such a way as to evade condemnation within this model of reader identification. In 1705, for example, Mary de la Rivière Manley explained that the responses of "Fear and Pity" propel readers to imitate novelistic examples, since "we in some Manner put ourselves in the Room of those we see in Danger; . . . and the fear of falling into like Misfortunes, causes us to interest our selves more in their Adventures" (35). She proceeded to argue that her *Secret History of Queen Zarah* would "instruct and inspire into Men the Love of Vertue, and Abhorrence of Vice, by the Examples propos'd to them" (38) in the text. Not until Richardson, however, would this defense result in the profound combination of critical success and moral validation awarded to *Pamela*.

The eighteenth-century regulation of novel reading also operated within this paradigm of identification paired with imitation. Thus, Maria and Robert Edgeworth, who in their 1801 *Practical Education* discouraged young women from reading novels, nevertheless deemed *Robinson Crusoe* suitable

because, they assumed, young women were simply incapable of imitating the appealing adventures and solitary travels of Defoe's hero (Armstrong, *Desire* 16–17). When Richardson successfully articulated his first sentimental novel as a deliberately ethical project, he did so not by disabling identification but by exploiting it. The instructive efficacy of *Pamela*, like that of Rowlandson's narrative, was theoretically inseparable from its ability to inspire affective sensation, for it was supposedly by sympathizing with these virtuous and pious heroines that readers were moved to imitate their exemplary behavior. It was precisely as a result of this sympathetic exchange between reader and text that Richardson could imagine English readers becoming a community of ethical individuals in response to the examples represented in his novel.

Eighteenth-century sentimental novels like Richardson's may operate within such a system of imaginative exchange, but they also develop within a context of other exchanges across cultural, national, and continental boundaries. The Atlantic Ocean is one such crossed and uncrossed border, an expanse that is implicitly invoked as a border whenever the labels "English" and "American" serve to define distinct and coherent literary traditions. Yet as Ian K. Steele has pointed out, the Atlantic is as much a conduit facilitating connection as it is a barrier encouraging insulation. This relation was perhaps even more acknowledged in the eighteenth century when, Steele notes, "[a]ny informed adult living within the English Atlantic empire in 1739 knew that the Atlantic Ocean was traversed regularly, whether or not that person had crossed it. This same person also knew that the North American continent had never been crossed by anyone" (273). Popular texts such as colonial "American" captivity narratives and "English" sentimental novels also regularly crossed this border. The exchanges and transgressions within and between these two kinds of texts are fundamental to the development and function of sentimental discourse during this period. The moving qualities of books such as Rowlandson's and Richardson's depend not only on their stories of transgressive mobility but on the movement of the texts themselves across the border of the Atlantic, the watery margin that at once sealed and held open the ambivalent relation between the American colonies and the British empire. The popularity of these two accounts of female captivity and their associated moral legitimacy is ultimately a measure of the degree to which they successfully obscured those transgressive elements.

Border Crossings

Like novelistic discourse, nationalist discourse relies on the profoundly affective experience of sympathy. From Ernest Renan's early claim that "na-

tionality has a sentimental side to it" (18) to Homi Bhabha's recent assertion that the nation is a form of "cultural identification" ("DissemiNation" 292-93) with a deeply affective dimension, discussions of nationalism insist on the substitutive empathy of identification. When Benedict Anderson links the nation with the novel, he does so precisely through this feature of identification. Not only do nationalist and novelistic discourse both emerge simultaneously in the eighteenth century, but, he argues, both rely on a new conception of temporality comparable to what Walter Benjamin calls "meanwhile," in which disparate and distant individuals are perceived to exist simultaneously. According to Anderson, it is in this open, transverse time associated with the novel, where separate characters live coincidental lives linked by a single narrative, that readers become able to imagine the community of the nation. New World creoles came to conceive of themselves as contemporaneous national communities, as "Americans" or "Brazilians," for example, by reading about and imagining the existence of others who resembled themselves, a phenomenon facilitated by the development of print capitalism and the growth in literacy and in print languages. This sentimental experience of imagining others whose experiences are similar to, if not interchangeable with, one's own—experiences such as the journeys taken by Creole functionaries along particular routes or "the shared fatality of trans-Atlantic birth" (57)—therefore becomes coincident with a feeling of stable national identity. Novel reading provided a way for these otherwise unrelated individuals to learn of their common experiences and thus "to visualize in a general way the existence of thousands and thousands *like themselves*" (77; emphasis added). To this extent, for Anderson as well as for Richardson, the imagined community created through sympathetic identification is a community constructed and held together on the basis of resemblance or likeness.

The movement of printed texts across regional, social, and cultural boundaries is the indispensable condition for producing such an imagined community and the identification on which it is founded. This movement has its analogue in the process of sympathy, which requires a crossing of the boundary between reader and text. One might therefore expect to find the earliest formations of both the novel and the nation in a text notable for its own mobility as well as for its ability to move readers. Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse, in their analysis of the "origins" of the English novel and European nationalism, find precisely such a text in the colonial American genre of the captivity narrative.² An experience of virtually incessant mobility is recorded by Mary White Rowlandson in her narrative of captivity among the New England Indians, which chronicles her violent abduction in the 1676 raid on Lancaster and her subsequent trials, both physical and spiritual, as she journeys with her Algonquin captors through the

wilderness. But it is the movement of the text itself, which traveled from the American colonies to England and found active readership on both continents, that is central to Armstrong and Tennenhouse's argument. By encouraging its readers to "care about" an unimportant Englishwoman and her sufferings, they claim, Rowlandson's captivity narrative constructs an imagined national community through the process of reader identification. Just as the abducted captive is "poignantly aware that survival depends on her ties to" (395) her increasingly distant Anglo-American community, the narrative "asked its readers [in England] to imagine being English in America" (394). Because the isolation of the Englishwoman in captivity among non-English people emphasizes her national difference, it enables readers to imagine their own position within a national community through identification with her.

The radical differences between the European captive and her Amerindian captors may have encouraged English readers to identify with Rowlandson, but those differences are presumably also what fascinated them so about her story. The circulation of Rowlandson's popular text across the boundary between colonial outpost and imperial center is therefore subtended by Rowlandson's own circulation across the even more profound cultural boundary between colonial Anglo-American society and tribal Algonquin Indian society. As Armstrong and Tennenhouse accurately note, the captive must sustain her ties to English culture in order eventually to reintegrate with the community she left behind. But securing that return also requires that Rowlandson develop relations within the Algonquin community she inhabits for nearly twelve weeks. The establishment of these latter ties complicates the model of reader identification on which Benedict Anderson's discussion of nationalism relies. Ultimately, Rowlandson's account calls into question the kind of imagined community produced by reader identification.

Throughout her captivity, Rowlandson continually asks her captors if and when she will be sold; and when asked by them "how much my husband would give to redeem me," she struggles to come up with a sum large enough not to "be slighted" by the Indian sagamores and small enough to "be procured" by her husband (151). Such dialogues reveal the captive's awareness that her return is contingent upon a mutually agreeable act of exchange between her Algonquin master and her Puritan husband. But if Rowlandson's return depends on both these parties, her survival depends almost entirely on her captors. As the previous chapter documents, she must learn to travel in Indian fashion through the wilderness, to recognize Algonquin words and customs, to barter for Indian food, and to tolerate it once it is given to her. Her narrative documents not only her early resistance to such alien customs but her increasing familiarity with and practical acceptance of

them. To this extent, it is not Mary Rowlandson's Englishness at all that determines her survival during captivity but precisely the degree to which she abandons her Englishness in the process of transculturation.

In other words, as a captive, Rowlandson occupies a position of cultural liminality rather than one of cultural integrity. That liminality requires that one ask what the readers of this captivity narrative identified with when they identified with Mary Rowlandson. While her narrative undoubtedly led readers in England to imagine "being English in America," it is equally likely that it led English readers on both sides of the Atlantic to imagine the possibility of not being English at all, to imagine a liminal or hybrid, if not an Indian, cultural identity. Indeed, the captive's experience of transculturation, which is everywhere evident in her narrative, undoubtedly contributed to the book's unprecedented public appeal. This narrative implicitly critiques the assumption that readers can identify only with figures whose culture, race, or nationality resembles their own, for to identify with Rowlandson is necessarily to identify both with her English difference from the Indians and with her difference from English culture through her participation in Algonquin society, both with her insistent Englishness and with her departure from it. Readers confronted and responded to the multiple versions of self, signaled by the resultant sense of singular interiority, produced by the captive's exchange across the colonial space of the contact zone.

When Rowlandson's narrative was originally advertised in the American edition of *Pilgrim's Progress*, it was called a "pathetically written" story, a phrase that in the seventeenth century meant "movingly written" (Derounian, "Publication" 244). What is moving about this narrative is precisely the fact that Rowlandson herself is always moving even while disclaiming that movement. Pathos inhabits the disjunction between the cultural identity that Rowlandson so insistently asserts and the textual evidence that contradicts this assertion. Franco Moretti has argued that "[t]ears are always the product of *powerlessness*" and that "[t]hey presuppose a definitive estrangement of facts from values, and thus of any relationship between the idea of *teleology* and that of *causality*" (162). This very tension is apparent in the scene in which Mary Rowlandson herself is first moved to tears. When the captive arrives at an Indian village and finds herself the lone Christian among a "numerous crew of Pagans" who "asked one another questions, and laughed, and rejoiced over their Gains and Victories," she "fell a weeping which was the first time to my remembrance, that I wept before them" (134). Rowlandson's Puritan reliance on typology and its promise that, like the captive Israelites, she too will be delivered from affliction clearly encounters a threat at this confrontation with the quantitative strength of the Indians. Rowlandson weeps at that moment when what should happen may not happen, when values and facts fail to coincide. Likewise, her read-

ers are moved at those moments when what Rowlandson *claims* to be—a coherent English subject and a model Puritan goodwife—coincides least with what she *appears* to be: a mediating subject who participates in the tribal economy, is able to conform to Indian social practices, and has a command of at least the basics of Algonquin language. The captive professes an identity whose fixity is belied by the unstable and mobile process of identification that supports that identity.

Rowlandson's narrative points toward a model of identification that emphasizes disjunction and disavowal rather than resemblance and imitation. It challenges the notion that sympathetic identification constitutes an equivalent and seamless exchange in which individuals imaginatively substitute themselves for others "like themselves," a formulation that assumes rather than explains the sentimental affect that characterizes the narrative of novels and nations. Why should identification produce sympathetic tears even as it produces a coherent community? The tears that are so often a sign of sentimental identification—of the successful establishment of this relation of apparent equivalence—result, I suggest, not from the seamless substitution of self for other but from the necessary margin of inequivalence produced by such an exchange. In other words, what is sentimental about the imagined communities novels create is the obscured fact that they are not based on likeness.

The psychoanalytic model of ambivalent identification that underlies Homi Bhabha's description of national narrative accommodates this inequivalence, which Anderson's discussion overlooks. For psychoanalytic theory, to align identification with imitation or resemblance is to miss what Bhabha calls its "dialogical or transference" character, since any identification with a likable image or feature is always "constituted through the *locus of the Other*" ("DissemiNation" 313), performed on behalf of a gaze from the perspective of which that image is seen as likable. Two seemingly incompatible but nevertheless interdependent relations constitute this process: an imaginary or specular identification with that which the subject is (or wants to be) like and a symbolic identification with that which the subject is not (and often does not want to be) like. The first is an identification with an appealing image—with, for example, the image of the suffering English captive piously reading a Bible and yearning for home. The second is an identification with the displaced location from which that image appears as appealing—with, in Rowlandson's narrative, the liminal position of cultural and national indeterminacy. Furthermore, readers are compelled to identify with the former only by identifying with the latter, since the image of Rowlandson's coherent Englishness takes on particular value only from the locus or perspective of her transgressive liminality. The circular movement between these two modes of identification generates a disjunctive gap

between them, a gap that is concealed beneath the construction of fantasy.³ For Anderson, the national identity of subjects arises from their identification with similarities, with others "like themselves." Here, identity is instead a retroactively determined effect of naming that works to erase any identification with difference.

This model of a doubled identification can account for the sentimentality of novels and nations in a way that identification understood as pure resemblance or imitation cannot. For the "moving" effect of novelistic and nationalist discourses results from the dialectical movement of identification across the gap or border between resemblance and its failure. The tears generated by sympathy function as a veil that masks the incommensurability between these two levels of identification, obscuring difference within the fantasy of sameness and commonality. This liminal gap of inequivalence marks, for Bhabha, the site of subjective agency, a site for the articulation of cultural difference and minority resistance. But that agency veiled by affective sensation can also constitute a violence aimed at difference, deployed in the service of preserving and reproducing a community based on resemblance. Such forms of active agency are commonly disavowed and concealed by the passive sensation of "being moved." In this sense, sympathy is a movement that insistently denies its own activity, a border crossing that conceals its own transgressiveness.

As objects in motion across various borders, both Rowlandson and her text are in perpetual danger of going astray, a possibility that is suggested by Rowlandson's need to insist that she has returned physically and ideologically unviolated to her Anglo-American community.⁴ Her narrative consistently disavows the transgression it documents. That disavowal is repeated by the model of identification that Armstrong and Tennenhouse borrow from Anderson, a model that allows the imaginary substitution of the English reader for the wholly English captive, to constitute a balanced exchange that leaves no disabling remainder. The liminal space of transculturation within Rowlandson's narrative suggests that the operation of identification cannot be reduced simply to a function of mere resemblance or likeness but must account for the moments at which resemblance slips and equivalence fails. The narratives of female captivity published in the century following Rowlandson's reveal that it is precisely at such moments that identification acquires its affective property, its sentimentality. Although Rowlandson patiently awaits her deliverance from captivity, even choosing to "wait Gods time" (161) rather than accept one Indian's offer to help her escape, later captives often betrayed less faith in typology and divine providence. In the disjunctive moments when teleology's promise of what should happen failed to conform to causality's account of what was happening, those cap-

tives were sometimes prompted actively to escape from their captors. Therefore, to investigate the function of sentimentality within the discourses of the novel and the nation, it is necessary to pay attention to the strategies of later captivity narratives, to determine what happens when their captive heroines move across cultural frontiers, and to ask why readers are moved to tears by their stories.

Captivity and Escape

The popularity of Rowlandson's narrative and its ideological usefulness in an era of persistent Indian warfare and waning Puritanism prompted the publication of hundreds of editions and numerous collections of captivity narratives, both factual and fictional, throughout and beyond the following century. By the late eighteenth century many of these texts—like the 1787 "Panther Captivity" and Ann Eliza Bleecker's 1793 *History of Maria Kittle*—are virtually indistinguishable from sentimental novels.⁵ Such developments clearly result in part from the incorporation of structural and stylistic elements from novels like Richardson's, which were among the most popular books read in the American colonies. But this consistent development cannot be explained solely by the later adoption of novelistic elements, since the production of readerly sympathy serves a crucial function in the strategies of captivity narratives; indeed, some of the earliest narratives already rely on the sympathetic relation between reader and text that only later marks sentimental novels. My interest here is not in chronologically privileging one of these genres over the other but in determining the political implications of their production of sympathy around the scene of female captivity. To do so requires placing these two narrative forms in a dialogic transatlantic context, where, during the eighteenth century, they clearly overlapped. As Armstrong and Tennenhouse suggest by linking Rowlandson's narrative directly with Richardson's *Pamela*, the captivity narrative and the sentimental novel were in cross-continental dialogue from the beginning. By reinitiating this exchange, I aim to expose the gap that these texts' sentimentality works to seal—the gap between an identification with the captive's virtuous and passive suffering and an identification with her transgressive and active agency. Although many eighteenth-century narratives of male captivity were often as sentimental as those of women,⁶ I focus on the latter here because they more tellingly reveal the function and strategy of such affect. In these narratives sentimentality works through reader identification to mask the agency of women held captive, an agency whose often startling violence encouraged colonial practices of genocide against

Amerindians. At the same time, sentimentality works to reproduce performatively the Euro-American community, a process facilitated by the fact that so many captives were also mothers.

Captivity narratives nearly always begin with the moment of Indian attack, and the descriptions of these attacks incessantly focus the reader's attention on the abduction or death of infants. It has been estimated that at least one-fifth of the women taken captive from New England were either pregnant or had just given birth (Ulrich 205). While no evidence exists to suggest how many of those who published their stories were among that one-fifth, the number of narratives that begin with a woman being hauled into captivity from the delivery bed is staggering enough that any reader comes to expect this opening image. When the Indians carry away Elizabeth Hanson with her four children, the "youngest child but fourteen days old," Hanson claims that the Indians "immediately before my face knocked its brains out" (232). Mehetable Goodwin's Indian master "violently Snatch the Babe out of its Mother's Arms, and before her Face knockt out its Brains" (Mather, *Decennium* 210); Hannah Dustan's captors literally pull her out of the bed in which she had only days earlier given birth, and "e'er they had gone many steps, they dash'd out the Brains of the Infant, against a Tree" (Mather, *Decennium* 264). Clearly, this stylized scenario was both politically effective and potentially affective, and later narratives capitalize on its sentimental potential. When the Indians arrive at the home of Frances Scott, Scott's young daughter "ran to her Parent, and, with the most plaintive Accents, cried, 'O Mamma! O Mamma! Save me!' The Mother, in the deepest Anguish of Spirit and with a Flood of Tears, intreated the Savages to spare her Child; but with a brutal Fierceness, they tomahawked and stabbed her in the Mother's Arms." These narratives insistently subtract the captive mother's capacity to act in response to the violence against her family that she is forced to witness. Frances Scott's narrative even inserts details that further enhance the captive's passivity: the Indians instruct the mother to remain firmly in one place while her children are killed, and they subsequently throw the corpses onto the floor "near the Mother" (9).

If the children of female captives happen to escape such early deaths, they are often immediately separated from their mothers.⁷ Mary Rowlandson claims that in the turmoil of the attack on her home, Indians were "ha[u]lling Mothers one way, and Children another" (143), and she expresses outrage over the fact "that I should have Children, and a Nation which I knew not ruled over them" (147). Jemima Howe, separated from her nursing infant, insists that "the Indians, I suppose on purpose to torment me, sent me away to another wigwam which stood at a little distance, though not so far from the one in which my distressed infant was confined but that I could

plainly hear its incessant cries and heart-rending lamentations" (Drake 147).⁸ Jean Lowry records the successive removal of her five children from her and asks "What could be more distressing to a tender hearted Mother?" (11) than to know that "the fruit of my Body . . . should be brought up in Paganism" (14). Rachel Plummer's much later narrative recounts a similar incident in language that is even more explicitly sentimental. Plummer believes that the Indians deliberately "brought my little James Pratt so near me that I could hear him cry. He would call for mother, and often was his voice weakened by the blows they would give him. I could hear the blows. I could hear his cries; but oh, alas, could offer him no relief" (338). Repeatedly, the captive mother is portrayed as an unwilling spectator made to watch or overhear the violent murder or abuse of her child. Her sympathetic suffering is enhanced by her enforced lack of agency. Philip Fisher has identified with sentimentality precisely such "moments when action is impossible," for "[t]ears represent the fact that only a witness who cannot effect action will experience suffering as deeply as the victim" (108). The position of witness held by grieving mothers in these narratives is shared by the captivated and sympathetic reader, who, like the mother, can only passively endure this emotional scene.

The event of captivity is followed by an almost incessant mobility, as the captive must travel with the Indians into and through the wilderness. Within this entirely alien culture, Anglo-American assumptions, behavior, and morality invariably misfire and fail to elicit the responses they are accustomed to producing. While such failed gestures include pleading and fainting, the most common one is weeping. Massy Harbison explains that she "never wept" while being forced to watch her children murdered and scalped because "it is more than probable, that tears at those seasons of distress, would have been fatal in their consequences; for savages despise a tear!" (41). Cotton Mather writes that the worst hardship captives must endure is being made to watch "their Friends made a Sacrifice [*sic*] of Devils before their Eyes, but be afraid of dropping a Tear from those Eyes, lest it should, upon that provocation, be next their own Turn, to be so Barbarously Sacrificed" (*Decennium* 208). Later he notes that "when the Children of the English Captives Cried at any Time . . . the manner of the Indians was, to dash their Brains against a Tree" (*Decennium* 213). The captive's tears may lead to death, but as they do so they translate directly into tears of sympathy in the reader, as Mather's concluding words suggest: "*Nescio tu quibus es, Lector, Lecturus Ocessis; Hoc Scio quod Siccis scribere non potui* [I know not, reader, whether you will be moved to tears by this narrative; I know I could not write it without weeping]" (*Decennium* 213).⁹ As early, then, as 1699, tears in captivity narratives signal not only the sympathy of English captives for one an-

other but, even more significantly, the reader's vicarious sympathy for the suffering captives—a response that explicitly distinguishes them from the unsympathetic Indians.

These strikingly recurrent narrative elements all insist on the captives' Christian and English difference from their captors, and they insistently encourage reader identification with that difference. Because the experience of captivity, however, entailed crossing the cultural frontier into Amerindian society, it often resulted for many of these captives in more startling forms of transgression. These transgressions amounted not to differences from the Indians but to differences from the English, since survival frequently necessitated abandoning Anglo-American cultural traditions, social and legal standards, and gendered codes of conduct. Captivity was, in this sense, a profoundly ambivalent experience, not only for the captives but for their readers. Often the same narratives that circulated horrifying accounts of victimization also circulated fascinating stories of escape from dominant social and moral norms. In fact, the act of escape from captivity was frequently the most ambivalent element in these narratives, since it was at once a heroic instance of female bravery and an often extraordinary act of female violence.

What is most remarkable about such stories is that they were so easily and readily legitimated by the very culture whose standards they blatantly transgressed. The white captive of the Indians most often returned to her community not as a criminal or as a threat to the social order but as a heroine and an exemplar of it. The strategies of sympathetic identification that we have seen at work in these narratives are central to this cultural legitimation. The increasingly sentimental discourse these narratives employ manipulates the transgression occasioned by captivity into a heroism that over the course of the eighteenth century would become more and more explicitly associated with nationalism. Narratives of female captivity fulfilled this nationalist function particularly effectively, largely because so many of the women taken captive were mothers whose bodies quite literally reproduced the nation and therefore had to be preserved. By encouraging readers to identify with the captive mother, these narratives attempt to veil her violent act of agency beneath the urgency of this reproductive necessity.

This strategy is evident in the famous captivity of Hannah Dustan, which Cotton Mather incorporated into no fewer than three of his publications between 1697 and 1702.¹⁰ Mather clearly intended the narrative to serve as anti-Indian propaganda and at the same time to encourage Christian piety in his readership. Yet what is most remarkable about this brief account is its use of sympathetic identification with a captive's motherhood to sanction a lawless act of female violence. Mather's attempt to conceal the ambivalence of that identification by denying its transgressiveness provides a model for the operation of sentimentality in both novelistic and nationalist discourse.

When Indians attack and enter Hannah Dustan's home in a 1697 raid, her husband is absent; she is taken from her lying-in bed, made to watch her newborn infant murdered before her eyes, separated from the rest of her family, and dragged through miles of wilderness by her Indian captors. Mather's narrative enhances the captive's fear of both ideological and physical violation by "those furious tawnies." Her Indian captors, converted to French Catholicism, will not allow her to say her "English" prayers, and they tell her that when they arrive at an Indian village she "must be Stript, and Scourg'd, and run the Gantlet through the whole Army of Indians" (*Decennium* 265).

The ritual of the gauntlet, in which an assembled file of Indian villagers beat the captives with sticks and rocks as they ran through them, frequently triggered fears of rape, since the captives were sometimes (or at least imagined that they would be) forced to disrobe and run naked.¹¹ It is apparently this frightening threat to her own body that leads Dustan to persuade her midwife and a young boy captive with her to assist her in killing and "cutting off the Scalps of the Ten Wretches" while they sleep. The captive's deed dangerously resembles—in its method of attacking sleeping victims, the use of Indian tomahawks, and the practice of scalping—the same Indian threats it was an attempt to escape from. Mather easily justifies Dustan's murder of her Indian captors, however, by insisting that "being where she had not her own Life secured by any Law unto her, she thought she was not Forbidden by any Law to take away the Life of the Murderers, by whom her Child had been Butchered" (*Decennium* 266). The captive's active violence is explicitly sanctioned by the violence she has passively witnessed and endured, and it is more specifically sanctioned by the conditions of motherhood and threatened female sexuality.¹²

Mather's emphasis on these conditions attempts to subordinate the unavoidable possibility of the reader's identification with the act of female agency itself. From its beginning the narrative places the reader into the position of the passive mother who must witness the destruction of her home and children. But this specular identification is supported by another identification, for it is precisely from the perspective of her transgressive act of violence that the image of Dustan as a passive victim acquires its forceful appeal. This necessarily doubled identification produces an inconsistency—in this case, a yawning gap—between the image of the innocent English mother and her incredible act of "Indianized" aggression. What is ultimately affective about this story is the imperfectly sealed margin between these two identifications, between a sympathetic grief for the mother's loss and a sympathetic approval of her aggressive compensation for that loss.¹³ Affect fills the space of that disjunction, and in doing so it converts the subjective agency of the captive into (and conceals it within) the passive sensation of being moved.

Indian captivity stories like Dustan's often served to justify genocide, and Cotton Mather clearly appropriates her example to support and encourage anti-Indian sentiment and action. But Mather's careful explanation of Dustan's motivation and his strategic veiling of her own aggression suggest that her act may have represented as much of a threat as it did a response to one. Clearly, this Puritan goodwife's murder of ten Indians was unusual enough to require explanation. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich explains that although colonial American women were generally expected to respond to battle or captivity with submission and piety, actions like Dustan's might have been validated simply by the absence of her husband, for whom Dustan would have been acting as legitimate proxy (179). But even if such conditions sanctioned Dustan's refusal to submit to Indian captivity, the condition of coverture, which subjected seventeenth- and eighteenth-century New England women to legal, economic, and civic representation by their husbands, rendered wives captive in another sense—to a patriarchal authority that virtually required female obedience as a duty (Ulrich 6–7). In this context, Dustan's act of violence was not only unusual enough to require explanation but also radical enough to require containment by Mather's discourse.

The necessity and the function of Mather's affective representation of her experience become evident in comparison with the best-known instance of female violence in New England before Dustan's legendary escape. Four years before he publicly celebrated Dustan for killing ten Catholicized Indians, Cotton Mather publicly condemned Elizabeth Emerson, Hannah Dustan's unmarried sister, for allegedly killing her newborn twins. Dustan received reward money in exchange for the Indian scalps, was invited to visit at the home of Judge Samuel Sewall, and became something of a celebrity. Emerson was tried, convicted of murder, and hanged.¹⁴ Mather's responses to these two events certainly mark the differences between Indians and English infants as victims of violence, but the relation between the two agents of violence suggests why Mather emphasized Dustan's reproductive motherhood and why that emphasis effectively obscured the very elements of female aggression that, in her sister's case, were considered most threatening and purifiable.

At the same time that he applauds Hannah Dustan's action, Mather demonizes her Amerindian victims. In this way, the narrative of her captivity, which circulated in an era of French and Indian warfare, works to construct an explicit border between the Protestant Anglo-American community and the outside threats to its coherence and identity, and it does so by constructing an impassible border of difference between the English captive and her Frenchified Indian captors. Like Rowlandson's narrative, Mather's account insistently denies that the captive herself violates that border. By forging an

explicit identification with Dustan's motherhood, by asking in a sense that its readers imagine themselves as mothers, the text produces an imagined community and emphasizes the necessary reproduction of that community. Yet this identification, this crossing between reader and text, also involves a transgression that it denies. Only by acknowledging the ambivalence that surrounds her act of agency and readers' response to it can we account for how Dustan's narrative could produce an imagined English community in one century and an imagined American community in another.

By the nineteenth century, Hannah Dustan's story had become an example of a specifically American national valor and of a heroism that is encoded not by the doctrinal law of the state but by the sentimental law of motherhood. Robert B. Caverly, who published *Heroism of Hannah Duston* in 1874, offers Dustan as an inspirational national heirloom to the living descendants of "old New-England mothers" (14) and cites her heroic escape as the originary moment of the colonies' eventual rise to independence. He includes in his book a genealogical list of her thirteen children and compares her story to that of Hannah Bradly, who in 1736 shot one Indian and killed another by pouring a tub of boiling soap over his head when he entered her home. He notes that Bradly, like Hannah Dustan, "left numerous progeny" and that her "descendants are to be found in New England almost everywhere" (57). The monument erected in her honor represents a seven-and-a-half-foot figure of Dustan "with uplifted tomahawk, in the act of executing the courageous, tragic exploit" (*Complete Description* 22), which the statue commemorates; and the inscription carved into the monument virtually insists on her long-lasting reproductive value by describing her as one "of our ancient mothers" (Caverly 379). Mather's strategy of justification was still being repeated by the end of the nineteenth century, when Charles Corning's account of the event offers "the horrors of the fire-side massacre at home," "the agony of beholding innocent infants dashed against rocks or impaled on sharp stakes," and "the vengeance of outraged womanhood" as explanation for how "civilized women and mothers" could "become more savage than the savages themselves" (38). Significantly, Corning's account concludes with a reminder that because Dustan was the source of "an active prosperity, who have done well their part in the making of New England," she should be remembered as "a stern, unyielding matron" rather than as "the prototype of the fabled Amazon" (39).

Collections of captivity narratives began appearing in the late eighteenth century and continued to be published throughout the nineteenth century. Examples such as John Frost's 1854 *Heroic Women of the West* often followed a principle of inclusion that favored stories of maternal heroism such as Hannah Dustan's. Likewise, the 1825 edition of Massy Harbison's narrative has appended to it the story of Mrs. Merrill's defense of her Kentucky home

from Indian attack in the 1790s. Mrs. Merrill is described as a "heroic mother" who "in the midst of her screaming children and groaning husband, seized an axe and gave the ruffian a fatal blow" (62). After repeating this act on the next four Indians who rush toward her, a retreating Indian reportedly exclaims that "the squaws have taken the breach clout and fight worse than the *Long Knives*" (63). The conclusion to Harbison's own narrative assures its readers that her sufferings resulted in "successful issue; as they tended to give fresh impulse to those who were already engaged in the conflict, and to engage others in it" (44).

Narratives such as these clearly work to reproduce their readers as an imagined national community, but they simultaneously produce an identification with the female transgression that a national rhetoric of maternal reproduction works to conceal. The affective appeal of these narratives can only be understood in terms of this dual identification. Sentimentality sutures the gap between these two levels of identification, as John Frost's introduction to his collection suggests: "The heroism of woman is the heroism of the heart. Her deeds of daring and endurance are prompted by affection. . . . Captured and dragged away from her home [she] endures fatigue, braves danger, bears contumely, and sometimes deals the death-blow to the sleeping captors, to save the lives of her children. Such is woman's heroism" (iii-iv). These aggressive mothers are, in Frost's conventional formulation, less agents than victims who are passively moved to action by maternal feeling. The sympathetic tears that accompany the captive's reentrance into her community reaffirm the coherent identity of that community only by pretending to erase her incommensurable agency. As Franco Moretti has claimed, the blindness produced by tears "enables us *not to see*. It is a way of distracting us from the sight of what has upset us, or rather of making it disappear" (179). The operation of sympathy, like the experience of captivity, must be seen as transgressive in both senses of the word—as a crossing that is inevitably asymptotic and that within its remaining and irreducible space always retains the potential of going astray.

Sympathy and the Novel

The heteroglossia that, for Bakhtin, characterizes novelistic discourse is not only an internal characteristic of the genre but an external condition for its production: novels appear out of the exchanges that traverse those zones of contact where cultures and nations chaotically cross.¹⁵ Colonial American captivity narratives document the radical cultural contact that takes place on such a border, and their further passage across the border of the Atlantic puts the narratives themselves into dialogic contact with other texts. This

ceaseless mobility suggests that novelistic discourse emerges not in fixed locations or static moments but within a constant movement *across* borders. If sympathy is a movement that obscures its own activity, then novels are trans-cultural and transnational products that sentimentally obscure those crossings. By reading Rowlandson with Richardson, Armstrong and Tennenhouse reenact a crucial transatlantic exchange, one that significantly revises Eurocentric narratives of the novel. Sentimental novels like those of Richardson, however, insist on an equivalent notion of identification, which Armstrong and Tennenhouse adopt when they argue that Richardson's *Pamela*—like its forebear, the captivity narrative—creates a coherent national community. By reading Rowlandson through Richardson, reading the captivity narrative as a sentimental novel, they overlook the transgressive level of identification that operates not only in captivity narratives but in sentimental novels. The identification with difference becomes obscured beneath the fantasy of a coherent community of Englishness, much as the tears produced by captivity narratives veil the potential danger of an identification with the captive's agency. If instead of reading captivity narratives in the way that Richardson insists sentimental novels should be read, we read sentimental novels in the way outlined by the examples of captivity narratives above, the sympathetic identification on which those novels' reproduction of an imagined community relies appears far more ambivalent than Richardson made it out to be.

Richardson's preface to *Pamela* insists that its readers, by being "*uncommonly moved*" by the incidents in the novel, will imitate its heroine's example of virtue and piety. The letters from readers that follow his preface confirm their sympathetic engagement with Pamela's suffering, but they also reveal an identification with the least virtuous aspects of her behavior. One anonymous letter claims that the novel's "Incidents are so natural and interesting that I have gone hand-in-hand, and sympathiz'd with the pretty Heroine in all her sufferings" (6). But when this reader details those incidents that most engaged him, he claims to have identified not with Pamela's passive suffering but with her active attempts to escape from that suffering: "I have interested myself in all her Schemes of Escape; been alternately pleas'd and angry with her in her Restraint; *pleas'd* with the little Machinations and Contrivances she set on foot for her Release, and *angry* for suffering her Fears to defeat them" (6). In other words, what moves this reader are the moments of Pamela's own mobility, specifically those moments when she uses deceptive "Schemes," "Machinations," and "Contrivances" actively to escape from her confinement and from her captor, Mr. B.

In fact, while Pamela Andrews may be a paragon of female virtue, modesty, and benevolence, her entrance into a condition of captivity leads her into a practice of deception that resembles her captor's behavior more than

it adheres to her own principles of ethical conduct. She arranges a forbidden correspondence with Parson Williams, hides the pages of her journal, lies about her plans and motives, sneaks through the window while her guard Mrs. Jewkes sleeps, and attempts to escape over the garden wall. Like the heroines of captivity narratives who transgress their own moral standards by imitating their captors, Pamela learns this strategic trickery from Mr. B himself, who claims "I believe I must assume to myself half the Merit of your Wit, too; for the innocent Exercises you have had for it from me, have certainly sharpen'd your Invention" (202). Unlike the unquestionably immoral actions of her captors, however, the captive's deception is implicitly innocent, and it is innocent because it is legitimated by the condition of captivity itself. She momentarily subverts her own standards of conduct only in a grander effort to uphold those standards, and this logic of legitimation, which is also Cotton Mather's logic, obscures and dilutes her transgressive actions.

Pamela worries to her parents early in her captivity that she will become "an Intriguer by-and-by; but I hope an innocent one!" (118) and prays for the success of "my dangerous, but innocent Devices" (149). When Mr. B later places her before a mirror, he exposes the gap between her evident innocence and honesty and the concealed "Tricks and Artifices, that lie lurking in her little, plotting, guileful Heart" (162). These latter qualities, which he discovers by reading her journal, are secrets that the mirror will not reflect. But it is precisely this gap between Pamela's virtue and her artifice, between the image the mirror reflects and the information her pages reveal, that finally transforms Mr. B when he reads the "very moving Tale" (208) that is her narrative of captivity. The inconsistency between these two modes of identification are evident in Mr. B's explanation of his reform to Pamela's father: "tho' she is full of her pretty Tricks and Artifices, to escape the Snares I had laid down for her, yet all is innocent, lovely, and uniformly beautiful" (255). The sentimental affect that Mr. B experiences while reading her journal works to suture the irreconcilable gap between two planes of identification; Pamela's active agency is disavowed by the reader's passive sensation of "being moved."¹⁶ The prefatory letter from Aaron Hill, added to the second edition of the novel, offers Pamela's effect on her master as a model for the text's effect on its reader: "Not the charmer's own prattling Idea struck so close to the Heart of her Master, as the Incidents of the Story to the Thoughts of a Reader" (17).

Through this process of readerly sympathy, *Pamela* aims to reproduce a moral English community outside the text; it ideally transforms its readers into reformed Mr. Bs and virtuous Pamelas. This couple becomes, in effect, the textual parents of a nation distinguished by its "Example of Purity" from the vices of "a neighboring Nation; which now shall have an Oppor-

tunity to receive *English Bullion* in Exchange for its own Dross, which has so long passed current among us in Pieces abounding with all the Levities of its volatile Inhabitants" (5). This letter to Richardson imagines that the novel itself circulates as though it were English currency, a piece of "our Sterling Substance" whose inherent morality prevents it from "frenchify[ing] our *English Solidity* into Froth and Whip-syllabub" (7). If the novel supposedly produces and preserves a particularly English integrity and value in its audience, the resolution of its plot performs the same function within the novel. Mr. B's authentic marriage to Pamela averts not only the immoral but the economically unproductive possibility that if she "should have a dear little one, it would be out of my own Power to legitimate it, if I should wish it to inherit my Estate; . . . as I am almost the last of my Family, and most of what I possess must descend to a strange Line, and disagreeable and unworthy Persons" (230). Indeed, following the conclusion of Pamela's journal, Richardson assures us that, like the heroic mothers of contemporary captivity narratives, "[s]he made her beloved Spouse happy in a numerous and hopeful Progeny" (409). This assurance of reproduction with which the novel ends retroactively veils the agency that preserved the maternal body of the captive; the transgressive actions of the heroine are virtually washed away in the flood of tears produced by the sympathetic community within the novel and reproduced in the virtuous English community outside it. What the affect signaled by sentimental tears enables us not to see, in *Pamela* as well as in contemporary captivity narratives, is the efficacy of subjective agency.

That blindness has an efficacy of its own, particularly in the era of British warfare with the French and Indians during which *Pamela* was published. The novel's fantasy of a distinctively English community was no doubt particularly appealing to both continental and colonial English readers during this period, but it concealed an ambivalence capable of disrupting that community. When Esther Edwards Burr read Pamela's narrative of captivity in 1755, she was virtually immobilized at her home in New Jersey, afraid to travel to see her parents in Stockbridge or her friends in Boston because of the ongoing war. Burr records in her journal—written as a series of letters to her friend Sarah Prince—her response to *Pamela*, along with her concern over "the state of our Nation and the French Nation, and how probable it was that the French might overcome in their desighns [*sic*] to this Country" (76).¹⁷ Her responses to the novel and to the war, however, are equally ambivalent. Although she argues that Richardson "has degraded our sex most horribly, to go and represent such virtue as Pamela, falling in love with Mr. B. in the midst of such foul and abominable actions" (99), she later claims that Pamela "was more than woman—An *Angel embodied* [*sic*]" (105). When she complains about "what a tender Mother undergoes for her children at

such a day as this, to think of bring[ing] up Children to be *dashed against the stones by our barbarous enemies*—or which is worse, to be enslaved by them, and obliged to turn *Papist*" (142), her fears are torn between the local violence of the war and the national and religious implications of an English defeat. Her journal reveals the literal fear of captivity and the accompanying fear of mobility felt by New Englanders, especially by New England mothers. At the news of increased fighting she claims that "no body stirs no more than if it was impossible" and exclaims: "*Wo [sic]* to them that are *with Child*, and to them that give suck in these days!" (177). Upon finally attempting a delayed journey, Burr reasons that "if the Indians get me, they get me, that is all I can say" (223). Such conditions probably made reading *Pamela* and Indian captivity narratives particularly affective for New Englanders, and the sense of national community such texts created was no doubt consoling in an era when the borders of that community were challenged by both the French and the Indians.

Yet it is impossible to account for the political function of Richardson's novels and of sentimental captivity narratives within the later rhetoric of the American revolution against Britain without acknowledging their readers' more subversive identification with the captive heroine's transgressive actions. As Jay Fliegelman has argued, the later American reception of both *Pamela* and *Clarissa* tended to translate the heroine's "act of disobedience into a heroic rebellion" (*Prodigals* 130). The American Revolution appropriated these captive Englishwomen less as models of passive virtue than as victims whose suffering legitimated their active agency. Richardson's captive heroines, like Hannah Dustan, came to represent America itself as a "woman on the verge of bringing out a new and virtuous generation" (*Prodigals* 122). The very texts, therefore, that enable the community of the nation to be imagined are also texts that enable the disruption and reconfiguration of that community to be imagined. This possibility is occluded by the reduction of identification to simple resemblance and by the assumption that nationalist and novelistic sentiment is a function of that resemblance. Sentiment appears rather at those moments when resemblance fails, and it appears as the blinding veil of tears that both masks and marks an unaccountable border of difference.

Nation and Identification

If sentimental novels offer the consoling illusion of a community based on resemblance, then it is no surprise that such novels enjoyed their greatest popularity in the eighteenth century during periods of crisis in national coherence. The publication of *Pamela* in England in 1740 ushered in the cult

of sentimentality that remained popular until the 1780s, a period characterized by a series of military conflicts with the French and Indians that challenged and established the borders of the British Atlantic empire. Significantly, after the American War of Independence, the popularity of these novels quickly declined in England in concert with the general cultural devaluation of sentiment. It was precisely at this time, however, that sentimental novels began to flourish in America and to flourish as specifically American novels. William Hill Brown's epistolary novel, *The Power of Sympathy*, published in 1789, was advertised as "the first American novel" and still remains the text most often nominated to that status. Brown's novel contains a series of letters between Myra Harrington and Mrs. Holmes on the function and course of female education, in which Mrs. Holmes warns her charge that "the books which I recommend to your perusal are not always applicable to the situation of an *American lady*" (77). She explicitly develops this critique of English literature and implicitly calls for an American national literature when she remarks that the ridicule of educated women "is evidently a *transatlantic* idea, and must have been imbibed from the source of some *English* novel or magazine" (80). Mrs. Holmes goes on to recommend American-authored books characterized by "sentiment, morality and benevolence" (81) but marked also by nationalist themes: Noah Webster's *Grammatical Institute*, Joel Barlow's *Vision of Columbus*, and Timothy Dwight's *Conquest of Canaan*. If these texts are preferable, it is because "*English* books" are "filled with local descriptions, which a young woman here [in America] is frequently at a loss to understand" (77). The assumption undergirding Mrs. Holmes's claim is that the sympathetic identification that makes novels a form of moral education is hindered by the absence of a national identity shared by both reader and text.

Such assumptions, together with the persistent critique that American novels were poor imitations of British models, fostered a palpable anxiety in nineteenth-century America about producing and defining a distinct national literary tradition. The sentimental legacy of American exceptionalism continues to characterize the institution of American literary criticism. From F. O. Matthiessen's *American Renaissance* to David S. Reynolds's *Beneath the American Renaissance*, American literary criticism has repeatedly defined its object of study by distinguishing what is unique about literature that is produced in a place called America. The critical labels most often attached to American literature are also ones commonly affixed to the American nation: a commitment to democracy, the pursuit of freedom, the presence of the frontier.¹⁸ While these definitions aim to construct a separate but equal literary tradition, they also confine American literature, American culture, and even American writers within a totalizing identity by asserting a kind of sympathetic resemblance between them. As a result, American lit-

erary history becomes isolated from the transnational and transcultural contexts in which it inevitably takes shape.¹⁹

The undeniably affective appeal of exceptionalism suggests that its claim to distinctive and stable identity works only by obscuring mobility and difference. Indeed, the exceptionalist argument contains an ambivalence arising from the fact that it can only be from an external perspective—from the position of a European or British literary tradition, for example—that the uniqueness of American literature comes to seem so appealing. As Nina Baym points out, nineteenth-century reviewers defined “American” literature only by constant reference to English examples from which it purportedly differed (*Novels* 242). National literary traditions can be imagined as coherent, as structured on a principle of commonality, only by imagining the border between them to be fixed and uncrossed. By obscuring the movement and exchange of texts across borders like the Atlantic, exceptionalist theories tend to reproduce those texts’ sentimental fantasies of coherent national communities. These porous borders or frontiers are, however, precisely where Bakhtin locates the dialogism of novelistic discourse and where Homi Bhabha focuses his study of the ambivalence of nationalist discourse. The narrative duplicity that characterizes the nation and the novel must also be recognized in the process of identification by which their discourses create imagined communities.

The strategies of sympathetic identification within sentimental captivity narratives and novels elucidate the function of the “sentimental side” that Renan attributed to nationalism. If sentimental novels appear not within a static national topography but only in a context of exchange across colonial cultural and national borders, then the process of identification on which that genre relies must accommodate the relation between individuals who lack, rather than share, commonality. The inevitable limitation of resemblance is concealed within the fantasy of a community based on resemblance—an imagined community that is sentimental precisely to the extent that it lacks resemblance. Perhaps what the novel and the nation most deeply share, then, are these ambivalent relations between subjects who are, in fact, not alike. By repeating the strategies of discourses that insist on equivalence, exceptionalism reproduces the fantasy of resemblance and community and perpetuates its concealment of the sometimes violent agency that preserves the imagined body of the nation, that “mother country” that reproduces itself through the ambivalent strategies of sympathetic identification. Captivity narratives and sentimental novels of the revolutionary era would exploit such gendered representations in order to mobilize anti-British aggression. But as the next chapter argues, popular postrevolutionary sentimental novels elaborate the ways in which the dilemmas of agency suddenly faced by women were shared by citizens of the new republic.

Chapter 3



REPUBLICAN MOTHERHOOD AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY AMERICA

THE TITLE PAGE of the 1773 edition of Mary White Rowlandson’s captivity narrative featured a woodcut that depicts the captive defending her home by aiming a disproportionately large gun at four armed Indians. This illustration is, of course, consistent neither with the details nor the agenda of the text itself, since the captive left her burning home with a child, not a gun, in her arms and is more easily imagined reading a Bible or sewing a shirt than shooting a rifle at her captors. The title of this tenth edition, *A Narrative of the Captivity, Sufferings and Removes of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson*, also abandons the religious emphasis of the original, and its subtitle singles out from the many “remarkable Events” of her captivity the provocative claim that she was “treated in the most barbarous and cruel Manner by those vile Savages” (fig. 3). “The Sovereignty and Goodness of God” is no longer the subject of nor the redeeming agent in this edition; instead, its subject is the individual Mary Rowlandson, who is retroactively

between humans and machines cannot be preserved, when the seemingly inviolable border between them is crossed, exposed as an almost paradoxical hybridity. The otherwise enraged, aggressive, and unsentimental Sarah Connor cries at the moment when she finds herself unable to kill Miles Dyson (Joe Morton), the man who will become responsible for developing the self-regulating military computer that will initiate nuclear holocaust in the not too distant future. Sarah Connor is effectively paralyzed at the moment when she, like the viewer, suddenly confronts the series of paradoxes on which the film is based: she must both behave like a machine and use them to kill humans, all in order to ensure that humans will not be killed by the machines they create. Her tears and her subsequent, otherwise uncharacteristic profession of love to her son blur the inseparability of and the exchanges between machine and human exposed in this scene.⁶ The terminator's expression at the end of the film of what is presumably a form of cross-cultural and transtemporal understanding—his claim that “I know now why you cry, but it is something I can never do”—both reasserts the distinction between himself and humans and movingly cedes them cultural superiority and therefore future dominance. As the machine allows himself to be lowered into a vat of molten steel where, for the good of humans, he will be terminated, John Connor cries on his mother's shoulder. Meanwhile, she holds down the button on the machine that destroys the only machine in the film that, her concluding narrative voiceover sentimentally notes, managed to “learn the value of human life.”

The ambivalence of *T2*'s content is mirrored in the terms of its extraordinarily popular success. Much of the film's appeal, as the media coverage of its release indicated, depends on its use of special effects, which are enabled, of course, by the use of technology. And yet for all the technological performances the film enacts, its agenda is finally an antitechnological one; like captivity literature, the film permits audiences to indulge in that which they simultaneously disavow. The seeming opposition between humans and machines, like the one between captives and their captors, works to facilitate easy emotional alignments in viewers, even if the emotion works in part to mask exchanges that belie that opposition. If it is imperative that such identifications be problematized by exposing the cultural difference they conceal as well as the violence they propel, one way of doing so is to put such seemingly transparent texts into dialogic exchange with seemingly unreadable texts like Hammon's, for together they reveal the ways in which identity and identification both depend on and violate boundaries. Precisely by initiating such exchanges *Captivity and Sentiment* has sought to bring into focus the ambivalent colonial encounters obscured within sentimental narratives of American literary and national history.

Notes

Introduction

1. I am thinking in particular of ethnohistorical studies of cultural, national, and racial contact in colonial America, documented and discussed in the work of James Axtell, Colin Calloway, John Demos, and Neal Salisbury.
2. See Ernest Renan on the nation's obligation to forget, a concept that I develop within the more specific context of Jacksonian America in chapter 4.
3. This study concludes with Harriet Jacobs's slave narrative, published on the eve of the Civil War, but it does not suggest that this cultural tradition ends there. The discussion of the film *Terminator 2* in the conclusion, as well as more recent films such as *Not without My Daughter*, suggest its persistence, as does Christopher Castiglia's fascinating analysis of the Patty Hearst affair (87–105).
4. For an important reformulation of American literary and cultural studies within a more complex network of international and intercultural relations, see the introductory essays by editors Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease in the collection *Cultures of United States Imperialism*. See also Toni Morrison's *Playing in the Dark* for an analysis of the Africanist presence that functions within American literature as a support to its exceptionalist ideals of freedom and democracy.
5. My treatment of captivity narratives eschews the categorizations that have dominated discussions of the genre from early essays by Pearce and VanDerBeets to recent books by Namias and by Derounian-Stodola and Levernier. These include gendered divisions between male- and female-centered narratives, divisions within women's narratives that distinguish varieties of response to captivity, and historical and stylistic divisions (traditionally between seventeenth-century narratives with religious or colonization agendas, eighteenth-century propaganda narratives, and nineteenth-century sentimentalized narratives and novels). My interest is rather in the sites of ambivalence and agency where these categories overlap and conflict and that such divisions therefore tend to obscure.
6. Castiglia's study shares with mine an interest in the female agency imagined in captivity narratives. Its only sustained consideration of sentimentality (108–10), however, does not examine its crucial role in validating and obscuring that agency, including its aggressively imperialist forms. As a result, I advocate a far more ambivalent framework for understanding the female agency that Castiglia celebrates.
7. Nancy Armstrong perceptively contends that Tompkins's analysis is sentimental because it “claims authority on the basis of exclusion” (“Why Daughters Die” 6).

8. Among these works, to which this study owes an enormous debt, are Baym (*Woman's and Novels*), Douglas, Kelley (*Private*), Tompkins, Davidson (*Revolution*), and Samuels ed.
9. Richard Poirier, for example, defines "the best American books" as "an image of the creation of America itself . . . of the expansion of national consciousness into the vast spaces of a continent and the absorption of those spaces into ourselves" (76). Philip Fisher likewise legitimizes novels like Stowe's through an exceptionalist appeal; sentimentalism represents a discourse through which is articulated one of the three "hard facts" that "[f]or America, . . . have had an unusual force" (10).
10. I would also argue that the critical turn of interest to women writers and sentimental fiction, a development of extraordinary value for American literary and cultural history, has at the same time served a redemptive function within that history that has gone largely unnoticed. The appealingly distinctive identity constructed for American literature by Fiedler and others founded in later books—like Richard Slotkin's *Regeneration through Violence* and *The Fatal Environment* and Annette Kolodny's *Lay of the Land*—that powerfully exposed the exploitative and appropriative violence enshrined in classic American literature and the frontier myth. On the other hand, Kolodny's *The Land before Her*, which followed her earlier critique of masculinist empire building, emphasized the rather more appealing virtues of community and garden building in women's literary responses to the American wilderness. The rise of critical interest in Stowe's liberalism and abolitionism might bear a similarly redemptive relationship to the conservatism and imperialism increasingly associated with Cooper.

1. Captivity, Cultural Contact, and Commodification

1. Unless otherwise noted, citations refer to the edition of Rowlandson's narrative in Lincoln, which follows the second New England edition printed in 1682 and includes the preface.
2. For accounts of King Philip's War emphasizing the impact of diminishing land available to the Indians and their increased dependence on trade controlled by European colonists, see Leach and also Sturtevant (92-94). See Vaughan for an account that rejects (too easily, in my view) the importance of land for King Philip's War. Note that Rowlandson, who dates the attack February 10, 1675, employed the Julian calendar. According to modern record keeping, the year was 1676.
3. These woodcuts appear in the 1771 Boston edition of Rowlandson's narrative, held in the Newberry Library's Ayer collection.
4. In the 1682 London edition of the narrative, the preface is signed "Per Amicum." For a discussion of seventeenth-century editions of Rowlandson's text, see Derounian "Publication."
5. Some recent studies that focus on issues of conflict and contradiction in Rowlandson's text include Howe, Breitwieser, Derounian-Stodola and Levernier, and Castiglia.

6. In a remarkable historical coincidence, the Rowlandson's Indian servant was later killed by another captive Puritan woman, Hannah Dustan. Samuel Sewall, in a diary entry for 1697, records his meeting and discussion with the returned captive Dustan, and he describes Dustan's murdered Indian master as one who "formerly live[d] with Mr. Rowlandson at Lancaster" (372). See Griffin for a notation and brief discussion of this passage (47). For more on Dustan's captivity, see chapter 2.
7. The nearest towns to both the north and south of Lancaster were the praying towns of Nashobah and Marlboro, suggesting that Rowlandson's hostility was rooted in beliefs that preceded her entrance into captivity. See the map in Vaughan for these locations (217). Pulsipher's account of the 1677 murder of six Christian Indians provides additional evidence of anti-Christian Indian sentiment by Anglo-Americans in Massachusetts: one of the convicted men was from Lancaster, and another was the son of John Hoar, the Concord lawyer who appears near the end of Rowlandson's narrative to negotiate her ransom.
8. The other dominant perception of Indians by Puritans, exemplified by men such as John Eliot, was as members of the lost tribes of Israel for whom conversion and "civilization" would do the work of cultural (re)integration (Vaughan xv). But Rowlandson's hostility toward the "praying Indians" indicates her utter lack of sympathy for projects like Eliot's as well as for his perception of the Indians. For an account of Eliot's praying towns in the context of Puritan utopian thought and practice, see Holstun.
9. See, for example, Lincoln and *Present State*.
10. See also Brumm (esp. 20-33).
11. Roy Harvey Pearce's description of the genre emblemizes this approach: "The Puritan narrative is one in which the details of captivity itself are found to figure forth a larger, essentially religious experience; the captivity has symbolic value; and the record is made minute, direct, and concrete in order to squeeze the last bit of meaning out of the experience" (2). See also David L. Minter and Levernier and Cohen (xvii-xix).
12. Kathryn Zabelle Derounian usefully describes these two modes as "empirical narration (the 'colloquial' style)" and "rhetorical narration (the 'biblical' style)," a characterization that reflects the separation between the captive's participant status and her interpreter status ("Puritan Orthodoxy" 82). See also Derounian-Stodola and Levernier (101-2).
13. Breitwieser argues that Rowlandson's grief over the death of her daughter Sarah, who dies in her arms during captivity, marks an overvaluation of worldly ties that within orthodox Puritanism should be subordinate to spiritual concerns. Because Rowlandson resists that injunction, her grief exceeds the available typological interpretation of her experience, thus leading her "toward recognizing Indian society as a society, rather than as lawless animality" (148-49). See Derounian's "Puritan Orthodoxy" for another analysis of Rowlandson that emphasizes psychological sources for the text's inconsistencies.
14. John Demos likewise notes the frequency of exchanges between the Indians, the English, and the Dutch in colonial New England, and remarks on "the dailiness, the sense of familiarity, even the nonchalance, with which all parties met

- and interacted" ("Cannoe' Diplomacy"). Salisbury reminds us of the likely ways in which the European emphasis on trade for goods altered precontact economies, when exchanges between Indian bands were probably aimed at maintaining alliances more than acquiring products (*Manitou* 48-53); see Salisbury ("Indians' Old World") for an account of precontact exchange networks.
15. I take the reflective metaphor from Marx's claim that one commodity "acts as a mirror to the value" (*Capital* 59) of another commodity. Marx, of course, distinguishes as two modes of exchange the isolated act of direct barter from the circulation of commodities, but in the hybrid colonial economy that developed between natives and settlers, such distinctions were not so easy to maintain. As a result, I do not suggest that the exchange of Indian captives corresponds directly to either of these modes but rather that such exchange can be usefully informed by an understanding of the captive as an unusual commodity in a specifically colonial market.
 16. For other accounts of these various sorts of exchange, see Salisbury (*Manitou*), Calloway (*Dawnland*), Sturtevant, and Vaughan.
 17. Marx makes this analogy when he notes that "[i]n a sort of way, it is with man as with commodities. Since he comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtian philosopher, to whom 'I am I' is sufficient, man first sees and recognizes himself in other men" (*Capital* n. 59).
 18. My emphasis differs both from the anthropological economics of Marshall Sahlins and from Pierre Bourdieu's interest in cultural capital as it functions in the economics of social reproduction. As different as Sahlins's and Bourdieu's works are, they both focus on the reproduction—material or ideological—of single cultures, whereas my interest here is in that unknown quantity that is produced when two radically different cultures meet.
 19. The sense I am giving to the term *surplus* renders it analogous to the term *supplement* as Derrida defines it, but I adopt the former for the more precise sense of excess that it conveys, as well as its association with economics and exchange. At the same time, I must distinguish my use of *surplus* from Marx's notion of "surplus value," which I mean, at most, only dissonantly to echo. For Derrida on the supplement, see *Of Grammatology*.
 20. Vaughan and Clark suggest the usefulness of Turner's concept for the experience of the Indian captive but do not consider Rowlandson's narrative in its specificity. For an analysis of liminality that emphasizes race and gender in captivity narratives, see Castiglia (43-45).
 21. This observation was first made, though not developed, by Kolodny (*Land* 18).
 22. On adopted captives, see Heard, Calloway ("Uncertain Destiny"), VanDerBeets ("Indian Captivity"), and Axtell (*Invasion*). On Jemison, see Namias, and for an account of Williams, see Demos's *Unredeemed Captive*.
 23. Anne Bradstreet's collection of poetry, published in New England in 1678, was a second edition of the volume first printed in London in 1650. Together, Bradstreet's and Rowlandson's books represent exactly half of all published works written by women in seventeenth-century New England. See Koehler 54.
 24. Castiglia's analysis of Rowlandson's economic agency attributes to the captive a

- gesture of "refusal" (51) toward Puritan society that, in my view, inadequately accounts for her self-definition within the terms of dominant Puritan ideology.
25. In Irigaray's model, the only other role for women allowed within patriarchy, besides those of the mother and the virgin, is that of the prostitute. In the case of the prostitute, Irigaray locates use value in "the qualities of woman's body" and claims, therefore, that "[p]rostitution amounts to *usage that is exchanged*" (*This Sex* 186). I distinguish what I have called Mary Rowlandson's revirginalization from what might incorrectly be perceived as her prostitution. For unlike the prostitute's use value, Rowlandson's use value does not reside in the qualities of her sexualized body, nor does she cease to be private property. Rather, for her Puritan husband, she returns to the state of usefulness *in potentia* that characterizes the virgin.
 26. Only her final mention of an exchange is not followed by a visit to her son and by an expression of concern over his physical and spiritual well-being. That final record, near the end of her captivity, when she senses that her release is near, is followed instead by an outburst of tears and by a request for news about her husband (151).
 27. See *Present State* for evidence of this claim.
 28. Some editions of Rowlandson's narrative (1771, 1791, 1805) include what appears to be the name of another of Quinnapin's wives, Onux. However, other editions, both earlier and later, print "One, a Squaw" where these print "Onux, a Squaw"—indicating a printing error in one group of narratives or the other.
 29. See especially VanDerBeets (*Held Captive*), Pearce, and Vaughan and Clark. The latter argue for multigenericism by describing the captivity narrative as a combination of elements from spiritual autobiography, the jeremiad, the sermon, and the adventure story. But any limit placed on such a listing comes to seem arbitrary by excluding the important influence of such genres as the travel narrative, which links personal and spiritual growth with geographic or spatial movement, and the accounts of Christian suffering and martyrdom popularized by John Foxe's *Acts and Monuments* ("Book of Martyrs").
 30. See also Castiglia 5.
 31. See Armstrong and Tennenhouse's important and provocative analysis of Rowlandson's narrative as an "origin" of the English novel and the national imagining made possible by that form. Other discussions of the relations between the captivity narrative and the novel, especially the sentimental novel, have assumed that the two forms developed separately and that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century captivity narratives change (always for the worse, in these critics' views) as a result of being influenced by novels of sensibility. My argument, developed in chapter 2, seeks a more dialectical and transnational account of exchanges between the two genres.
 32. Breitwieser makes a brief but fascinating allusion to a possible connection between Rowlandson's narrative and the sentimentalism that would characterize so much of the literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when he suggests that "sentimentalism is a reappearance of the Puritan sublimation of mourning" (n. 210).

2. Between England and America

1. Mott classifies both texts as best-sellers according to historically gauged sales figures. For the publication history of the four 1682 editions of Rowlandson's captivity narrative—three in New England and one in London—see Derounian ("Publication").
2. Armstrong and Tennenhouse's chapter in *The Imaginary Puritan*, titled "Why Categories Thrive," also appeared as "The American Origins of the English Novel." My citations refer to the former.
3. Lacan is describing the relation between these two modes of identification when he explains that symbolic identification "is not specular, immediate identification. It is its support. It supports the perspective chosen by the subject in the field of the Other, from which specular identification may be seen in a satisfactory light" and "from which the subject will see himself, as one says, *as others see him*" (268). My summary here relies on Lacan (244-58; 267-74) and on Žižek's lucid discussion of the Lacanian concept of identification (100-110). Žižek explains that "in symbolic identification we identify ourselves with the other precisely at a point at which he is inimitable, at the point which eludes resemblance" (109); without this relation of difference, identification itself dissolves. Furthermore, Žižek notes that identity, unlike the circular movement of identification, is constituted retroactively, through "the radical contingency of naming" (95). The name—a signifier such as "American" or "English," for example—works to transform differential relations into a homogeneous identity.
4. Teresa A. Toulouse has argued that Rowlandson's insistence on her "inviolable body" "points to her own need to be reintegrated into the community as the same body (mentally and physically) that was wrenched from it—that went out into the wilderness but remained the same" (655-56).
5. Levernier and Cohen, for example, call *The History of Maria Kittle* "a captivity narrative molded to fit the modes of the 'novel of sensibility'" (xxviii), and they associate sentimentalism with European influence on America (xxiv). Annette Kolodny, in her important early reading of "The Panther Captivity," calls it a successful attempt "to bend the outlines of an Indian fertility myth to the requirements of sentimental fiction" ("Turning the Lens" 338). My own argument resists the clear distinctions between genres on which these claims rely.
6. The narratives of Peter Williamson (1757) and John Marrant (1785), both reprinted in VanDerBeets (*Held Captive*), offer examples of such sentimentality. Although captivity narratives were increasingly written by men during the eighteenth century, the narratives they wrote were most often about women. Namias suggestively claims that this emphasis on female figures by male authors evidenced the latter's anxiety about protecting the family in the face of frontier dangers (264).
7. Calloway explains that the practice of separating captives into smaller groups was a strategy the Indians employed in an effort to elude their pursuers ("Uncertain Destiny" 199), although the captives themselves interpreted it as an inhumane act of dividing families.
8. The text here is taken from Drake's 1851 *Indian Captivities; or, Life in the Wigwam*, although Howe's narrative was first published as a pamphlet in 1793. She was taken captive in 1755/56, at the onset of the French and Indian War.
9. The translation is Lincoln's. Mather introduces these concluding lines with an anecdote about a "Pettrified Man" whose body a traveler saw while visiting a ruined city in Italy. Mather virtually requires tears from his readers by claiming "That if thou canst Read these passages [about captivity] without Relenting Bowels, thou thyself art as really Petrified as the man at Villa Ludovisia" (*Decennium* 213).
10. Dustan's narrative first appeared in *Humiliations Followed with Deliverances* (Boston, 1697) and was subsequently included in *Decennium Luctuosum* (Boston, 1699) and in *Magnalia Christi Americana* (London, 1702).
11. The gauntlet ritual, Axtell notes, generally served the purposes of ritual adoption, since the captives who best survived this test were often chosen by tribal members to replace relatives who died in warfare (*Invasion Within* 312-14). Calloway more specifically suggests that the gauntlet served the symbolic function of "beat[ing] the whiteness out of the captive" in readiness for adoption and often consisted of only minor physical contact between the participants and the captive ("Uncertain Destiny" 204-5).
12. June Namias categorizes Dustan as the earliest example of the many "Amazons" who appear particularly in those captivity narratives published between 1764 and 1820 and whose aggressive acts of self-defense and escape she correctly aligns with nationalist purposes (33-34). My own analysis, however, challenges the separation between violent agent and passive victim on which types such as the "Amazon" and "Frail Flower" rely.
13. Hawthorne's version of Dustan's story, published in his *Magazine of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge*, significantly eliminates all possibility of a sympathetic response to the captive by portraying her as a "raging tigress" and a "bloody old hag" (136) who should either have drowned, sunk to her death in a swamp, or "starved to death in the forest, and nothing ever seen of her again, save her skeleton, with the ten scalps twisted round it for a girdle!" (137). By demonizing Dustan, Hawthorne eliminates the gap between an imaginary and a symbolic identification, effectively making identification with her impossible. Sympathy in Hawthorne's story is reserved for her strikingly maternal husband, "that tender hearted, yet valiant man" condemned to live with "[t]his awful woman" (137).
14. For a full account of Elizabeth Emerson's case in the context of Hannah Dustan's captivity experience, see Ulrich 184-201.
15. As Timothy Brennan points out, Bakhtin's notion of dialogism is not only textual but social (50). See Bakhtin's "Epic and Novel" in *The Dialogic Imagination*.
16. Like Hawthorne's version of Hannah Dustan's captivity narrative, Henry Fielding's rewriting of *Pamela* in *An Apology for the Life of Mrs. Shamela Andrews* makes sympathetic identification with the captive female impossible by eliminating the gap between her virtue and her agency.
17. Burr's father was Jonathan Edwards; her husband, Aaron Burr, was the president of what is now Princeton University; and her son was the future vice president of the United States. Her journal offers important insight into the con-

ditions of women's intellectual and daily life in the colonial eighteenth century. I thank Susan Howe for bringing this book to my attention.

18. See Baym for a discussion of reviewers' obsession with locating and defining a uniquely national literature in nineteenth-century America (*Novels* 241-48). Examples of exceptionalist theories of American literature based on themes like democracy, freedom, and the frontier include Lawrence, Matthiesen, Poirier, Henry Nash Smith, Bercovitch, and Reynolds. This brief list merely hints, however, at the persistence of exceptionalism within American literary criticism.
19. William Spengemann exposes the concealed tautology on which such definitions inevitably rely when he suggests that any definition of American literature operates by first selecting a group of texts and authors that are implicitly considered to be American. It is only second and on the basis of shared features or concerns (on the basis, precisely, of a shared identity based on resemblance) that these texts are explicitly labeled American (77-86). Because the second act of naming effectively obscures the first, the process of definition appears to fill in the term "American" only by, in effect, emptying it twice.

3. Republican Motherhood and Political Representation

1. See Vail for this publication history.
2. Sieminski mentions also that the number of Indians, their postures, and their rather European clothing all seem attempts to reproduce the artillery line of British soldiers in Revere's engraving.
3. Mary Beth Norton, an excellent source on women during the Revolution, comes closest to portraying the revolutionary era as the source for women's further emancipation, although she notes as well the increasing restrictions generated by the cult of republican motherhood. The collection of essays in Hoffman and Albert exemplify the argument that the status of women underwent no significant change during this era.
4. See also Denn for an analysis of the relation between this genre and the revolution. Denn focuses on prison narratives by men in his argument that such literature first articulated a distinctly American cultural character. As a result, he ignores the role of gender that is evident in any broader consideration of texts that employ the patterns of the captivity narrative, and he isolates a separate and distinct American culture and literature from other, predominantly British, influences.
5. See Bailyn's *Ideological Origins*. A pamphlet like Thacher's *Sentiments of a British American*, for example, might invoke the word *slavery* once, but it invokes the word *mother* five times. Stephen Hopkins's pamphlet *Rights of the Colonies Examined* likewise calls Britain "the mother state" ten times to its three references to slavery. These pamphlets are in Bailyn ed.
6. Bailyn *Ideological Origins* (58); quoted from Marchamont Nedham's *Excellencie of a Free State* (Richard Baron's 1767 ed.), 18-19.
7. See also Bloch for a discussion of the emergent distinction between private fe-

- male virtue and public male virtue and the equation of chastity with female virtue (42, 52).
8. In the House of Commons, Edmund Burke denounced the British troops' use of Indian allies after hearing of this event. See Leary's "Introduction" 14.
 9. See Namias for a good survey of various biographies and accounts of Jane McCrea (117-28).
 10. Quoted in Leary, "Introduction" (9), from Hilliard's *Essais*, Vol. 2, trans. Eric LaGuardia, 267.
 11. Although her father disapproves of her attraction, he cannot force Jane to renounce her new lover, for "the laws of the country did not allow her father to restrain her inclinations" (32). Such an absence of force is quite in contrast to Belton's blind pursuit of colonial defeat in the name of "what the nobles of England called duty" (20).
 12. The fascination with Jane McCrea and her story apparently persisted well into the nineteenth century. An advertisement appearing in an 1853 retelling of her story offers "elegant Canes and Boxes" made out of the tree under which Jane was reportedly murdered. This ad promises that all Americans can own a piece of Jane as well as a piece of national history by purchasing "An Interesting Relic of the Revolution." By making these items available, George Harvey, who placed the ad, defends his act of "cutting down The Famous Jane McCrea Tree" and warns that "[a]ll other parties offering Canes for sale, representing them to be made from the renowned Jane McCrea Tree, are counterfeits, and will be dealt with accordingly." This remarkable ad, with its commercial refunctioning of the George Washington tree-chopping myth, appears at the conclusion of Wilson's account.
 13. *Charlotte Temple* was published in England in 1791, one year before Wollstonecraft's manifesto but was published in America only in 1794, two years after the *Vindication* had its first American printing. Susanna Rowson, an Englishwoman who was a former resident of the colonies, would later repeat the westward transatlantic journey that her text and her heroine had already made and eventually become an American citizen.
 14. For more on the publishing history of *Charlotte Temple* and audience reception of it, see Davidson's *Revolution and the Word*.
 15. The association of both Betsy, the Irish servant, and LaRue, the French assistant, with Roman Catholic nations is significant here, particularly given these two works' reliance on earlier captivity narratives. Narratives written by or about captives who traveled to and lived in Canada before being ransomed often generated a culture of fear about the "papists" that was second only to their fear of the Indians. See, for example, John Williams's captivity narrative in Vaughan and Clark, eds.
 16. See Douglas, "Introduction," *Charlotte Temple*.
 17. As obscure as he may have been, however, biographical information does attest that Herman Mann—a former teacher, father of eleven children, and editor of a newspaper called *The Minerva*—was a man. See Levernier and Wilmes, eds., 939-40.
 18. Although the single woman, or *feme sole*, had property rights, she nevertheless