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1 SUBJECTION AND SUBJECTIVATION

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I will begin by sketching out a problematic, or research programme, on which I have been working for some time now, which aims at resuming and recasting the notion of a *philosophical anthropology*. For reasons which, I hope, will become clear later, I suggest that such a programme ought to begin with a critical discussion, both historical and analytical, of the notions of *man*, the *subject* and the *citizen*, which together delineate the ambivalent order of subjection and subjectivation.

My presentation will be divided into three parts:

1. A brief recall of previous discussions around 'philosophical anthropology', including Heidegger's critique of that notion.
2. A critique of Heidegger's critique, focusing on the importance of the onto-political category of the 'citizen' in the debate.
3. An outline of what a renewed philosophical anthropology could be: it is there that subjection and subjectivation properly come into play.

Allow me, first, some schematic considerations on the past controversies that surround the very notion of a 'philosophical anthropology'. At certain moments they have been quite harsh; at others they have played a decisive role in shaping twentieth-century philosophy,¹ overdetermined though by various other developments: on one side, the theoretical effects of successive

philosophical 'turns' (epistemological, ontological, linguistic); on the other, the progressive shifting of the very meaning and use of the term *anthropology* in the field of the so-called human sciences, from the once prevailing notion of a physical or biological anthropology towards a social or cultural or historical and, more recently, cognitive anthropology.

Indeed, the great debate on 'philosophical anthropology', which remains the source of many of the issues that might be raised today around this notion, took place in Germany in the late 1920s and early 1930s, taking the form of a multilateral confrontation between the prominent representatives of *Lebensphilosophie*, the neo-Kantian and the newly born phenomenological currents. It was crossed by references to evolutionist biology, to the great 'crisis of values' after the First World War and the Socialist revolutions, to what one would describe as the long process of secularization of the Image of the World and Man itself, which began in the sixteenth century and led to a problematic victory of intellectual, social and technical rationality in the twentieth.

It seems likely that the expression 'philosophical anthropology' was coined by Wilhelm Dilthey himself, whose aim was to reorganize philosophy in a historicist perspective around such notions as successive psychologies and modes of comprehension in human history. Ernst Cassirer, another representative of the Kantian tradition, though quite opposed to Dilthey's vitalist or 'irrationalist' standpoint, did not explicitly use the term *philosophical anthropology* in his pioneering studies of the 1920s (*The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms; Individual and Cosmos in the Philosophy of the Renaissance*)² but he did express its programme by combining two directions of investigation: he analysed the 'symbolic' (we might also say 'logical', or 'signifying') structures of representation, whether scientific, moral or aesthetic, which inscribe 'reason' or 'rationality' in the history of culture; and, conversely, he investigated from a historical perspective the philosophical problem of 'Man', or 'human essence', in its relation to the World, to God, to his own 'conscience'. Here, it is mainly a question of tracing all the implications of the great successive ruptures which, from classical antiquity onwards, following an irresistible though not necessarily linear progression, have established 'Man' as the centre of its (or his) own universe.

The year 1928 marks a crucial turn in this discussion: it sees the simultaneous publication of two books, which explicitly cite 'philosophical anthropology' as their central goal. One was written by Bernhard Groethuyesen, a socialist-leaning historian and philosopher of culture, and a pupil of Dilthey. The other, which remained uncompleted because of its author's premature death, was written by the Catholic philosopher Max Scheler, one of Husserl's first and most distinguished students, though profoundly influenced

by Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson (in short, by the *Lebensphilosophie*), and very hostile to the shifting of phenomenology towards the problematics of consciousness.

According to Groethuyesen, 'philosophical anthropology' is above all a reconstruction of the great dilemma running throughout the history of philosophy, which opposes the philosophers of interiority – for whom the answer to the question of human essence has to be looked for in the *gnôthi seauton* ('know thyself'), in intimate self-consciousness – to the philosophers of exteriority, who seek to analyse in a positive way the position of Man in the cosmos, *phusis* and *polis*. Whereas, according to Scheler, 'philosophical anthropology' is a typology of *Weltanschauungen*, which combines in a specific manner the perception of nature and the hierarchy of ethical values, ranging from the ancient universe of myth to the modern universe of the will to power, and places them above 'resentment', religious faith and progressive Enlightenment.

As early as 1927, however, in the introductory paragraphs of *Being and Time* – and, in a more developed manner, in his 1929 book on Kant – Martin Heidegger had radically challenged all these attempts: not only did he reject the identification of philosophy and anthropology, thus challenging the notion that the basic questions of philosophy were anthropological, but, more radically, he denied the very possibility of asking the question of the nature or essence of Man without enclosing philosophy in an unsurpassable metaphysical circle. Certainly, this would not lead Heidegger in his turn to suggest that the anthropological question be handed over to a more 'positive' discipline. On the contrary, it was a question of showing how, while defining itself as 'anthropology', philosophy would find itself trapped in the same dogmatic horizon as the 'human sciences', unable to overcome the dilemmas of subjectivism and objectivism. This led Heidegger to discuss at length the old Kantian formulation, which proposes that the system of transcendental philosophical questions concerning the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, of morals, of the very teleology of reason, be summarized in the one critical interrogation: 'What is Man?' But whereas other readers and followers of Kant understood this question as asking for a *foundation* of critical philosophy (admittedly a 'human' or 'humanist' one), Heidegger himself read it as an indication of the *limits* of the critical problematic in the Kantian style: the limits beyond which critical philosophy either falls back into dogmatism (not a theological, but a humanist dogmatism), or sets about deconstructing any notion of 'foundation', thus interrogating the very form of metaphysical questions.

But the core of the representation of Man as the 'foundation' of his own thoughts, actions and history, has, for three centuries at least, not been simply

a valorization of human individuality and the human species as the bearer of the universal, it has been the representation of *Man as (a, the) subject*. The essence of humanity, of being (a) human, which should be present both in the universality of the species and in the singularity of the individual, both as a reality and as a norm or a possibility, is *subjectivity*. Metaphysics (which from this point of view, and in spite of the depth and novelty of the questions asked by Kant, includes transcendental philosophy) relies on a fundamental equation – we might also read it as the equation of foundation as such:

Man = (equals) Subject

or:

The Subject is (identical to) the *Essence of Man*

This is why – and later Michel Foucault, notably, would take up this question again – the privileged theoretical object of modern metaphysics, starting with critical philosophy and ending, not surprisingly, with anthropology, is endlessly to reflect on the 'empirico-transcendental doublet', the difference between empirical individuality and that other eminent subjectivity which alone bears the universal, the 'transcendental Subject'. But we should also remark, following Heidegger, that this fundamental equation, which summarizes the philosophical definition of 'the essence of Man', can also be read *the other way round*: as an equation that provides the clue to *all questions of essence*, to the 'metaphysical questions' in general.

Why is this the case? Because the equation 'Man = Subject' is not *any* essential(ist) identity. It is the equation which has replaced the old onto-theological equation: 'God = (the) Being' (which you can also read: God is the Supreme Being, or God is Being as such) to become the archetype of every metaphysical attribution of an essence, by means of which the normative form of the universal is supposed to inscribe itself in the very substance, the very singularity of the individual. This allows us to understand why, when Heidegger introduces the concept of Dasein as originary reference for philosophy, while indicating in a very ambivalent and perhaps perverse manner (as a puzzle, or a trap for philosophers), that the Dasein at the same time 'is and is not' the subject, 'is and is not' Man with respect to the being of its (his) existence, the theoretical effect he produces is deconstructive and destructive *on both sides*. It deconstructs and destroys the concept of the Subject, but it also deconstructs and destroys the concept of the essence (or, if you like, the concept of 'concept' in its traditional constitution). *If* there were something like an 'essence of Man', that essence could *not* be 'the Subject' (nor could it be the Object, of course), i.e. a universal being immediately

conscious of itself (himself), given to itself (himself), imaginarily isolated from the existential context and contents which form its being-to-the-world, to human situations. But neither can we consider the Dasein, which substitutes the Subject, as an 'essence', although it appears as a generic concept of existence. It is rather the name, the always still provisional term by means of which we try to explain that proper philosophy begins when the questions about 'essences' are overcome.

Allow me to pause here. To put it briefly, I think that Heidegger's argumentation, which I have greatly simplified, is irreversible. It did not put an end, as we know, to the projects of 'philosophical anthropology'. But, consciously or not, it became a model and a warning for all twentieth-century philosophers who, especially after the Second World War, ventured to provide alternatives for philosophical anthropology or theoretical humanism, or simply tried to describe their limits.³

Though this critique is, as I say, irreversible, cannot be bypassed, it is itself riddled nevertheless with strange limitations and lacunae, with historical prerequisites which are extraordinarily fragile. We must examine them if we want to decide whether or not the question can be re-opened, possibly on quite new bases, different from those that ultimately trace back to the grand adventure of German Idealism, of which Heidegger appears as the ultimate (though heretical) representative.

The most immediate and striking mistake in Heidegger, although one not frequently recognized, concerns the very history of the notion of (the) *subject* in philosophy, provided we take it literally. Why is it not easily recognized? Obviously, because Heidegger, with some personal nuances, shares it with the whole modern philosophical tradition, from Kant to Hegel to Husserl to Lukács. This entire tradition considers and repeatedly asserts that it is with *René Descartes* that philosophy became conscious of 'subjectivity' and made 'the subject' the centre of the universe of representations as well as the signal of the unique value of the individual – an intellectual process which, it is claimed, typifies the transition from Renaissance metaphysics to modern science, within the general framework of the assault against ancient and medieval cosmology and theology. *Before* Descartes, it is merely a question of looking at the contradictory *anticipations* of the concepts of subject and subjectivity. *After* Descartes – that philosophical 'sunrise', as Hegel put it – it is a matter of finding the subject there, of *naming* and acknowledging it: this is the first of its successive philosophical figures, which together form the properly modern metaphysics of the subject.

But this story, however broadly accepted,⁴ is materially wrong. It is a mere retrospective illusion, which was forged by the systems, the philosophies of history and the teaching of philosophy in the nineteenth century. Neither in Descartes nor even in Leibniz will you find the category 'subject' as an equivalent for an autonomous self-consciousness (a category which itself was invented only by John Locke),⁵ a reflexive centre of the world and therefore a concentrate of the essence of man. As a matter of fact, the only 'subject' that the 'classical' metaphysicians knew was that contained in the scholastic notion of *subjectum*, coming from the Aristotelian tradition, i.e. an individual bearer of the formal properties of the 'substance.' Therefore, the more they rejected the substantialist ontology, the less they spoke of the 'subject' (which is, indeed, the case with Descartes, Spinoza and Locke, among others).

If this is the case, you will ask, when should we locate the 'invention of the subject' in the modern philosophical sense, at what place in history and in which truly revolutionary work? On this point there can be no doubt: the 'subject' was invented by Kant through a process that took place in the three Critiques. These three major works (1781, 1786, 1791) are immediately disposed around the great revolutionary event, this time in the political sense of the term. I will return to this point. It is Kant, and nobody else, who calls properly 'subject' (*Subjekt*) that universal aspect of human consciousness and conscience (or rather the *common ground* of 'consciousness' and 'conscience') which provides any philosophy with its foundation and measure.

Now, this reference to the Kantian text immediately allows us to correct another distortion in Heidegger's critique of philosophical anthropology, which nowadays has become all the more visible. What was the context that led Kant to systematize the table of the 'critical questions' of transcendental philosophy in order to connect them explicitly or implicitly to the question 'What is Man?' (i.e. the virtual programme of 'philosophical anthropology'). This context has less to do with a speculative elaboration of the reflections on the Subject than with a very pragmatic *Ausgang*, or 'way out', of speculation, in the direction of 'concrete' questions of human life. These are the 'cosmic' questions⁶ of the 'world' or of the 'mundane' (*weltliche*), not the 'scholastic' ones (which, according to Kant's terminology, are of interest not for the amateur, but only for the professional theoretician). On this point Kant is quite explicit: the practical questions of the world are those that connect knowledge and duty, theory and morals, with the existence of *humanity* and the very meaning of its history. The questions of and about the 'world' therefore, are not *cosmological*, they are *cosmopolitical*. To ask 'What is Man?' for Kant is to ask a concrete question, a question which is therefore more fundamental than any other, because it immediately concerns the experience, knowledge and

practical ends of Man as a *citizen of the world*. Indeed the Kantian *question* already involves and predetermines a formal *answer*: 'Man' is a (the) citizen of the world; his 'essence' is nothing other than the horizon within which all the determinations of that universal 'citizenship' must fall. The only thing that remains to do, then, is to elaborate and clarify the meaning of all this.

This remarkable formulation is not the exclusive property of Kant.⁷ At a decisive historical moment, at the very turning point of the 'bourgeois revolutions', we find it combining, within the intimate structure of philosophical language itself, two quite different series of conceptual paradigms. It indicates: (1) that the *human subject* is able concretely to meet the essence of its 'humanity' only within a *civic*, or *political*, horizon in the broad sense of the term, that of a 'universal citizenship', which implies epistemological, ethical and aesthetic rationality,⁸ and (2) that the 'citizen' belonging to any human institution and *subjected* to it, but particularly to the legal state (and probably more precisely the legal national state), can 'belong' to that institution and state as a *free and autonomous subject*⁹ only inasmuch as every institution, every state, is conceived as a partial and provisional representative of *humanity*, which in fact is the only absolute 'community', the only true 'subject of history'.

We have now arrived at the core of the question 'What is Man?' in Kant – namely, its civic and cosmopolitical content, which is inseparable from its metaphysical content. And we see that it is precisely *this* (including its idealistic/utopian aspect) that Heidegger would ignore. Not only is he not really concerned with the fact that the 'man' at issue in Kant is a 'citizen of the world' in the *political* sense (or in the *moral-political*, therefore also the *juridical* sense of the term)¹⁰ (unless he believes that this is a purely empirical and pragmatic matter, not a 'transcendental' one), but he does not see that the very proposition which equates the 'subject' and the 'essence of man', before and after Kant, relies on a *third term*, an 'essential mediation', by no means accidental, namely *the citizen*. This citizen may become symbolically universalized and sublimated, but never ceases to refer to a very precise *history*, where it is a question of progress, conflict, emancipation and revolutions. The result, which does not arrive by chance, is that at the very moment when Heidegger submits metaphysics and its anthropological derivations to the most radical questioning, he proves totally unable to see that the history of metaphysics, being intimately connected with the question 'What is Man?', is also originally intricately connected with the history of politics and political thought. No wonder, then, that he later engages in discussing the meaning of the Aristotelian 'definition' of Man as 'that speaking animal', 'that living being which disposes of *logos*', i.e. language, reason and discourse, *without* ever mentioning its counterpart, which in fact says the same thing: not *zōon logon ekhôn*, but *zōon politikon tē phusei*, 'the

being naturally living by and for the city', or the 'political animal'. This means that Heidegger will not even suspect *the originary unity of ontology, politics and anthropology*, except in so far as he denounces it as a particularly blind form of forgetting the sense of Being.

Suppose, now, that we take careful note of that shortcoming of Heidegger and correct it. We can then resume, on new bases, the problem of philosophical anthropology *without* completely losing the benefit of the Heideggerian critique of any essentialist conception of the 'subject'. Among the problems that immediately arise, there is precisely that of 'the subject' as *representation*: how was it historically constituted? What were the breaks, the *ruptures* in this process, which could be referred to successive figures of the citizen and citizenship? I have two theses about this, each of which would, of course, require longer explanations.

My first thesis is this: the whole history of the philosophical category of the 'subject' in Western thought is governed by an *objective* 'play on words', rooted in the very history of language and institutions. This play on words comes from the Latin, whence it passes to the Romance languages (including English), while remaining latent, repressed as it were, in the German language. This is a remarkable effect of the concrete universality of Latin in Western civilization, being at the same time the classical language of law, theology and grammar.

Of which 'play on words' am I speaking? Simply the fact that we translate as *subject* the neutral, impersonal notion of a *subjectum*, i.e. an individual substance or a material substratum for properties, but we also translate as *subject* the personal notion of a *subjectus*: a political and juridical term, which refers to *subjection* or *submission*, i.e. the fact that a (generally) human person (man, woman or child) is *subjected* to the more or less absolute, more or less legitimate authority of a superior power, e.g. a 'sovereign'. This sovereign being may be another human or supra-human, or an 'inner' sovereign or master, or even simply a transcendent (impersonal) law.¹¹

This historical play on words, I insist, is completely objective. It runs throughout Western history for two thousand years. We *know* it perfectly, in the sense that we are able immediately to understand its linguistic mechanism, but we *deny* it, at least as philosophers and historians of philosophy. Which is all the more surprising, since it could provide us with the clue to unravelling the following enigma: why is it that the very *name* which allows modern philosophy to think and designate the *originary freedom* of the human being – the name of 'subject'¹² – is precisely the name which *historically* meant suppression of freedom, or at least an intrinsic limitation of freedom, i.e. *subjection*? We can

say it in other terms: if freedom means freedom *of the subject*, or subjects, is it because there is, in 'subjectivity', an originary source of spontaneity and autonomy, something irreducible to objective constraints and determinations? Or is it not rather because 'freedom' can only be the result and counterpart of liberation, emancipation, *becoming* free: a trajectory inscribed in the very texture of the individual, with all its contradictions, which starts with subjection and always maintains an inner or outer relation with it?

Here then, is my second thesis. In the history of the 'problem of Man', as 'citizen' and as 'subject', at least two great breaks have taken place, which, certainly, were not simple events, but nevertheless marked irreversible thresholds. Philosophical reflection, in its most determining level (which I would call *onto-political*), remains dependent on these two historical breaks.

The first one was accomplished with the 'decline of the ancient world', or if you like when a transition took place, say, between Aristotle and Augustine, which meant the emergence of a *unified* category of subjection or *subjectus*, including all categories of personal dependence, but above all the interpretation of the subject's subjection as (willing) *obedience, coming from inside* – coming from the soul. In this respect obedience does not mean an inferior degree of humanity, but on the contrary a superior *destination*, whether terrestrial or celestial, real or fictitious. (This allows subjection to appear as the condition, or even the guarantee of future salvation.) But of course, the other side is that any 'citizenship', any immanent transindividual or collective freedom, becomes relative and contingent. The ancient structure fades away, the one that Aristotle had once developed in an exemplary manner: man as a citizen, that is, being 'naturally' or 'normally'¹³ a *politês*, but only in a given sphere of activity, the 'public' sphere of reciprocity and equality with his fellow men, who are like him – who *look* like him – placing aside and indeed *below* him the various anthropological types of dependent and imperfect beings: the woman, the child (or pupil), the slave (or labourer), and placing symmetrically aside and *above* him the ideal types of the teacher, the hero, the god (or the divine beings). Now that this ancient figure has been destroyed, the figure of the inner subject emerges, who confronts a transcendent law, both theological and political, religious (therefore also moral) or imperial (monarchical) – because he *hears* it, because in order to be able to hear it, he has to be called by it.¹⁴ This subject is basically a *responsible*, or an *accountable*, subject, which means that he has to respond, to give an account (*rationem reddere*) of himself, i.e. of his actions and intentions, before another person, who righteously interpellates him. Not a Big Brother, but a Big Other – as Lacan would say – always already shifting in an ambivalent manner between the visible and the invisible, between individuality and universality.

being subjected or subject-being, in an irreversible if not irresistible manner, while conquering and constituting their political citizenship. From now on, there could exist no such thing as 'voluntary servitude'. Citizenship is not one among other attributes of subjectivity, on the contrary: it is subjectivity, *that form* of subjectivity that would no longer be identical with subjection for anyone. This poses a formidable problem for the citizens, since few of them, in fact, will achieve it completely.

Now, what kind of 'citizen' is this? It cannot be only the citizen of some particular state, some particular nation, some particular constitution. Even if we do not accept the idealized notion of the Kantian 'cosmopolitical right', we can still maintain that it alludes to a universal claim, possibly to an absolute one. We could try to formulate it in this way: to equate man and citizen universally does not mean that only the legal citizens *are men* (i.e. human beings),¹⁸ or that men as such participate in humanity only within the conditions and boundaries of their official citizenship. We know it means that the humanity of human individuals becomes determined by the inalienable character of their 'rights'. We also know that this amounts to saying in effect that, while rights are always *attributed to individuals* in the last instance, they are achieved and won¹⁹ *collectively*, i.e. politically. In other terms, this equation means that the humanity of man is identified not with a *given* or an essence, be it natural or supra-natural, but with a *practice* and a task: the task of self-emancipation from every domination and subjection by means of a collective and universal access to politics. This idea actually combines a logical proposition: no liberty without equality, nor equality without liberty; an ontological proposition: the property of the human being is the *collective* or transindividual construction of his *individual* autonomy; a political proposition (but what is not already political in the previous formulations?): any form of subjection is incompatible with citizenship (including those forms which the revolutionaries themselves did not dare to challenge – slavery, the inequality of genders, colonization, exploited labour, perhaps above all these forms); and finally an ethical proposition: the value of human agency arises from the fact that no one can be liberated or emancipated *by others*, although no one can liberate himself *without others*.²⁰

I shall now conclude by posing very briefly two questions. We started with a philosophical investigation, which may have seemed a little scholastic: what does 'philosophical anthropology' mean? What might its programme be after the discussions that took place at the beginning of this century and the devastating critique of Heidegger?

First then: If it is true that *man, subject, citizen* – all these terms being connected through historical analysis rather than essentialist conceptualiza-

tion – remain for us the key signifiers of philosophical anthropology, must we arrange their figures in an evolutionary, linear process? This is not necessarily the case. I spoke of irreversible thresholds. Before medieval political theology had combined obedience to the Prince and obedience to God, the *subjectus* could not be given a unitary figure. Before the French Revolution and, generally speaking, the democratic revolutions equated man and citizen, it was not really possible to think of *rights* in a universal manner as opposed to privileges, or to do so without defining them as counterparts of obligations, services and duties. However, that a *new* form emerges does not imply that the ancient one simply disappears. So we see that the modern identity of man and citizen did not lead to the pure and simple negation or *Aufhebung* of the subjection to the Law, as an 'inner' voice. It has led, rather, to a new twist, a new degree of interiorization (interiority, intimacy) or, if you like, repression, along with a new 'privacy' of the moral sentiments. On the other hand, if there are inaugural thresholds or historical events, this does not mean that they arise out of the blue, without historical preconditions. Therefore a 'philosophical anthropology' along these lines must also be an investigation of repetition, recurrence and evolution as they mingle within history, i.e. of historicity as such.

Second: clearly, a critical rethinking of the philosophical debate *pro et contra* philosophical anthropology leads quite naturally to emphasizing a theme, better said a programme: that of enquiring on the *forms of subjection*. Borrowing from Michel Foucault, I would speak of an enquiry into the forms of *subjectivation* inasmuch as they correspond to certain forms of *subjection* – yet another fundamental 'play on words' . . . unless it is always the same. But to mention Foucault immediately leads to the following question. Following the permanent traces they have left in philosophical tradition, we spoke of *two* basic forms or figures of subjection: the one I described as 'unilateral speech' and the one I described as 'inner voice' (or inner calling). But why should we think that there are only two such figures? Why not search for others, from which other ways of stitching together the questions of man, subject and citizen would follow? Either in the past: figures of withering away (but does an anthropological figure, a figure of subjection, ever wither away?); or in the present: figures of constitution, possibly of becoming dominant. Was not this what Foucault would have suggested when he wrote on *norms*, 'discipline' or 'bio-power'? But before him, although in a different way, would not Marx also have provided us with similar hints when he returned in his theory from political alienation to human alienation, and from there to the structural 'fetishism' of merchant and capitalist societies, which goes along with the *use* of man and citizen in the valorization of objects, and their contradictory freedom

as legal subjects? Probably there are more than simply *two* ways of displaying the dialectics of subjection and subjectivation. Maybe there is no 'end of history', no 'end of the story'.

Notes

1. On 'continental' philosophy, above all; on 'insular' philosophy the influence of this debate has admittedly been weaker.
2. The much less interesting *An Essay on Man* was written later in 1941, when Cassirer had emigrated to the United States.
3. The term *theoretical humanism* was introduced by Louis Althusser in the 1960s to describe and criticize the roots of every 'philosophical anthropology', including the 'Marxist' variants. This marks a shift from the Heideggerian critique, while it retains, at the same time, the basic idea that the two problems of the 'essence of man' and of 'subjectivity' are inseparable. I will discuss this relationship elsewhere.
4. See, for example, Richard Rorty's brilliant *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1979), especially the first two chapters.
5. See my essay, 'L'invention de la conscience: Descartes, Locke, Coste, et les autres', forthcoming in *Traduire les philosophes*, Actes des journées de l'université de Paris – I, January–March 1992, Publications of the Sorbonne.
6. See the chapter in the *Critique of Pure Reason* called 'Architectonics of pure reason'. It is also in this text that Kant lists the three famous transcendental questions, namely: What can I know? What must I do? What can I hope? But it is only in his later *Course on Logic*, edited by one of his assistants, that he explicitly proposes summarizing them by means of the single question, 'What is Man?' The importance of this addition was hardly suspected until the twentieth-century debate.
7. Was it not Tom Paine who referred to himself in this way? But during this period he was not alone in moving in the 'cosmopolitan' direction.
8. Indeed, as Hannah Arendt observed, this means that Kant, formally speaking, retrieved the Aristotelian 'definition' of man as *zōon politikon*, although immediately to imply that the true *polis* should no longer be identified with any particular 'city-state', but only with the 'world city' as such. To trace back such an idea to the Stoics, via the Christian theologians and the political economists among others, is beyond the scope of this chapter.
9. Such a formulation can be traced back at least to the sixteenth century and *Les six livres de la République* by Jean Bodin, one of the first and leading theoreticians of the modern nation state. On this, along with other aspects of the history of the concept of 'the subject', see my 'Citizen Subject', in *Who Comes After the Subject?*, ed. E. Cadava, P. Connor and J.-L. Nancy (New York and London: Routledge 1991).
10. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger depicts the 'cosmic' nature of 'Man' and the 'cosmopolitan' character of the Kantian question 'What is Man' as *metaphysical* notions. Typically, what interests Heidegger in the Kantian notion of the 'cosmopolitical' is not the 'political', but the 'world', the *cosmos*.
11. There is no doubt that the 'subject' – namely, the one who is subjected – has to be 'personal' (though not necessarily 'individual'). Whether the 'sovereign' or the one *to whom* the 'subject' is subjected also has to be personal is much less clear: this is a basic theological question which I will leave aside here.
12. Everyone knows that the main characteristic of 'morality' in Kant's philosophy is that it provides the subject with its own essential 'autonomy'. The moral subject is 'autonomous', whereas the 'non-moral' or 'pathological' subject is 'heteronomous': but, in the Kantian view, this amounts to saying that *the subject as such* is 'autonomous'. (Therefore, to speak of an 'autonomous subject' is *essentially* redundant, whereas the 'heteronomy of the subject' marks a contradiction, a departure of the subject from its proper essence. All this amounts to an explanation of why the 'essence of man' is 'to be a subject': this expresses an imperative as well as a given, or a given that immediately gives rise to an imperative.)
13. Two possible translations of the Greek *τὴ φησε*.
14. The German tradition uses the word *Beruf* for this 'calling'.
15. These two phrases: 'to be subjected ultimately to the Lord God', and 'to be subjected to (nobody but) oneself', are basically equivalent; they refer to the same 'fact', viewed from opposite angles.
16. Such a pattern will, of course, become secularized in later political philosophy and ideology; see, notably, the way the necessary 'mediation' is instituted in Hobbes by the supreme authority of the state in order to create the conditions for a social (or civic) equality.
17. What Aristotle does not describe, because he is so rationalistic, are the *looks*, the *visual* and hallucinatory counterparts of this unilateral speech, which he so acutely defines in the *Politics* (mainly in Book I) and the *Nicomachean Ethics*.
18. Although there is a very strong tendency to do so, as Hannah Arendt noted when she remarked, in vol. II ('Imperialism') of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, that in the modern world 'apatriads' (people without a definite citizenship) are hardly considered human.
19. Or *vindicated*, to borrow from Mary Wollstonecraft's beautiful title.
20. Recall the 'Preamble' of the Statutes of the First International, written by Marx, a good Jacobin in this respect: 'The emancipation of the labouring classes will be the work of the labourers themselves.'